Tribunal Superior Eleitoral

PERMANENT ACTION PROGRAM AGAINST DISINFORMATION IN THE ELECTORAL COURT

ACTIONS AND RESULTS REPORT 2022 ELECTIONS

Brasília
TSE
2024

SUMMARY

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEED – Special Advisory on Confronting Disinformation

Asepa – Electoral and Party Accounts Examination Consultancy

CGE – Judicial Administrative Department

Coalizão – Coalition for Fact-Checking

FRENTE – National Front on Acting Against Disinformation

JE – Electoral Justice

Osint – Open-Source Intelligence

PGE – Electoral Attorney General's Office

PPED – Permanent Program for Acting Against Disinformation

PROFI – Institutional Strengthening Program based on Electoral Justice Image Management

AS – Disinformation Alert System for the Elections

Secom – Secretary of Communication and Multimedia

SMG – Secretariat for Modernization, Strategic and Socio-Environmental Management

STI – Information Technology Secretariat of the Superior Electoral Court

TRE – Regional Electoral Court

Court – Superior Electoral Court

TSE – Superior Electoral Court

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The PPED (Permanent Program for Confronting Disinformation), established to address the adverse impacts of fraudulent narratives on the image and credibility of electoral institutions, was provided with a structured action plan for the Elections 2022, encompassing short, medium, and long-term measures across three axes: (i) inform; (ii) empower; e (iii) respond.

Following this structure, a strategic plan was elaborated containing information on the Court management, the work execution, the criterion for selection of its partnership institutions and its work plan. The PPED (Permanent Program Acting Against Disinformation) presented three great pillars:

First, *confronting disinformation with information*: create and disseminate official, verified, and qualified information, so that people can shape their convictions in an informed and conscious way. Second, *confronting disinformation with qualification*: notably investing in the qualification of civil servants of the Electoral Justice, as well as investing in training of strategic partners and the population in general. Thirdly, confronting disinformation entails a focus on behavior control, and notably, content control: through monitoring open data and social media, and deploying technological resources to counteract inauthentic behaviors and coordinated efforts aimed at spreading disinformation.

The PPED was directed to act against two kinds of disinformation: (i) disinformation against the electoral institutions integrity, with fraudulent content that affect: a) the electoral process in its different phases, since the registration of candidates up to the certification of the chosen and elected ones;

(b) the functioning of the voting machines and other aspects of electronic voting system;

(c) the Electoral Justice, members, and other collaborators; (d) other acts related to the organization and to the elections realization; and (ii) disinformation against Democratic State of Rights, with content directly or indirectly related to promoting a coup d'état agenda.

Supplementary to PPED, the Institutional Strengthening Program (PROFI) arise from the perception that the disinformation phenomenon promotes a dissociation between the quality of the services performed and the social perception of the electoral institutions by the citizens. Therefore, it proposes the development of actions that improve positive impressions around electoral institutions, such as the perception about the impartiality and professionalism and the importance of the Electoral Justice.

More than 160 entities and organizations contributed with actions and adopted concrete measures to minimize the impacts of disinformation on electoral-political scenery, according to its respective institutional acting areas. Among these partnerships, we highlighted the ones made by fact-checking agencies, social media platforms, civil society organizations, academic entities, public agencies, and press outlets associations.

This report aims to present a review of the actions and the results of these programs, as well as to evaluate the goals fulfillment foreseen in the respective work plans.

Highlighted actions

1. Establishment of the Special Advisory for Confronting Disinformation, comprising a multidisciplinary team, consistently trained, and solely dedicated to the task.

2. Presentation of the PROFI - Institutional Strengthening Program based on Electoral Justice Image Management.

3. Establishment of the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections, a search tool designed to fighting against false news by redirecting disinformation to a moderated, privileged channel integrated with digital platforms.

4. Enhancement of the *chatbot* in collaboration with WhatsApp, by accessing fact-checked news, Q&A about the electoral process and, since 2022, enabling non authorized notifications with messages against disinformation, reaching over 6.2 million users and active users, making it one of the largest *chatbot*s on the platform in the world.

5. Establishment of the *official channel on Telegram*, allowing voters to access fact-checked news and learn more about the integrity of the electoral process. Nearly 375 thousand active users during the electoral period, making it the largest channel among public institutions in Brazil and with TSE being the first electoral body in the world to have a cooperation agreement with the platform.

6. Maintenance of a notification center within the Electoral Justice Apps (e-Título [TSE App for voters documentation], Mesário [TSE App for election officials]) that allowed direct communication between the Electoral Justice and the approximately 40 million users of these Apps.

7. Expansion of a network of broadcasters of quality content on electoral institutions and democratic culture, involving media associations, digital platforms, influencers, public and private entities, as well as religious leaders, in order to distribute messages related to campaigns such as the Peace and Tolerance in Elections, encouraging youth voters' participation and confronting electoral harassment.

8. Improvement of the "Fato ou Boato" (Fact or Rumor) page, incorporating a search tool that facilitates the identification of fact-checking articles.

9. Expansion of an open data monitoring network on social media to detect false, violent, or anti-democratic narratives, to quickly identify the incidence of inauthentic behaviors and disinformation practices in general.

10. Procurement of a digital monitoring service for false, violent, or anti-democratic narratives, with the triple aim of broadening the scope of scanning, obtaining customized reports with trend analysis, and transferring expertise to the AEED team.

11. Establishment of the National Front to Confronting Disinformation (FRENTE), carried out by more than 2,100 volunteers from the Electoral Justice.

12. Development of a Business Intelligence (BI) tool to record and monitor events and activities conducted under the FRENTE across the country.

13. Launch of *Pause*!! program – Bulletin for Confronting Disinformation, a weekly newspaper digitally distributed, designed to debunk false viral narratives, encourage engagement in the fighting against disinformation and provide tips and information.

14. Release of the Manual for Confronting Disinformation and Reputation Defense by the Electoral Court for Electoral Court employees.

15. Introduction of the Basic Guide to Confronting Disinformation with a set of clear and simplified alternatives to mitigate the presence of disinformation in public discussions about the Brazilian electoral process.

16. Presentation of the Voting Machine Guide, which provides a simple, clear, and accessible explanation of all the legal and technical elements ensuring the transparency, security, and veracity of the electronic voting process.

17. Launch of the Guide for TSE Institutional Partnerships, aiming to expand the number of strategic alliances and guide official partnerships regarding actions related to confronting disinformation and defending democracy.

18. Preparation of the Clarification Map of emblematic cases of disinformation against the elections, presented to civil servants on the weekends of the first and second round of elections, as a tool for quick access to fact-checking materials on the Electoral Justice on "Fato ou Boato" page.

19. Creation of the "Pills for Democracy" series, daily short lessons on social media discussing key topics on official TSE profiles and groups on Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram.

20. Development of online training actions with national meetings, which trained approximately 800 employees from Electoral Registries across the country on disinformation and related topics.

21. Execution of 19 mobilization caravans at the TSE and TREs to raise awareness, sensitize and engage in the fight against disinformation and for the defense of Brazilian electoral and democratic institutions involving more than 6,000 civil servants.

22. Periodic hosting of exchange workshops with international electoral bodies (INE-Mexico, JNE-Peru, TSE-Costa Rica, TE-Panama) to exchange experiences, discuss challenges, trends, and forms of collaboration to confronting disinformation.

23. Conducting technical exchange visits with 16 organizations leading the global forefront in confronting disinformation, based in Belgium, France, and Germany, with financial and logistical support from the European Union.

24. Offering training courses for key actors, in collaboration with digital platforms, to educate influencers, opinion leaders and members of political parties.

25. Formalizing agreements with 30 out of the 31 currently registered political parties with the TSE, conducting activities aimed at raising awareness among their members regarding the illegality and undemocratic nature of disinformation practices.

26. Update of the risk management tool, mapping hypotheses and proposing preemptive solutions for a quick and effective response to events and narratives harmful to the image of electoral institutions.

27. Implementation of routine analysis of journalistic coverage to identify interviews, reports and articles related to criticisms, innovations and proposals for improving strategies to confronting disinformation.

28. Formalizing agreement with the Electoral Attorney General's Office to maintain a fast and efficient communication channel for handling complaints related to communication practices that violate the law.

29. Formalizing agreement with 14 religious and para-religious leaders and entities to promote agendas related to ensuring peace and tolerance in elections.

30. Formalizing agreements with 55 academic and class representative entities, organizing scientific events and academic publications, granting interviews and publishing opinion articles in the press.

31. Approval of specific regulations aimed at ensuring the legality of electoral communications.

32. Creation of the Disinformation Radar, allowing Electoral Justice employees quickly and simplified access to disinformation trends and respective official responses or verification materials.

33. Conducting an internal census research involving more than two thousand civil servants from all Electoral Courts in the country, aiding the design of incentive policies to increase volunteers' participation in FRENTE initiatives.

34. Conducting a study on the demography of distrust, utilizing demographic indicators (gender, age, geographical position, and level of education) from social trust surveys to identify priority audiences and forms of communicative approach.

The institutional programs in numbers

» Total amount of partners: 162.

» Number of memberships in 2022: 96 (an increase of 145% members).

» TSE (Superior Electoral Court - SEC) team directly involved: 12 professionals with diverse training in the areas of Law, Political Science, Disinformation, Social Communication, and Information Technology.

» TREs (Regional Electoral Courts - RECs) team directly involved: 27 focal points dedicated to confronting disinformation, along with members of strategic committees formed within these courts and other involved civil servants.

» Engaged servers: recruiting 2,102 volunteers for FRENTE, spread across all states.

Confronting disinformation with information

» Coalition for fact-checking - Elections 2022: Published 252 pieces of content throughout 2022, with 112 articles verified by the Electoral Court and another 140 by Fact-checking agencies.

» FRENTE: Executed 372 actions at community and local levels, including publication of academic and opinion articles, interviews, participation in press debates, hosting lectures and organizing thematic events on democracy, electoral integrity, and confronting disinformation in all states.

» "Fato ou Boato" page: 5.4 million user accesses and unique user visits between January 1st and December 31st, 2022.

» Notifications through Electoral Justice Apps: Informative notifications sent to over 40 million unique users.

» Messages exchanged in the WhatsApp chatbot: Approximately 177 million messages exchanged from the beginning of April to December 31, 2022 (an approximate 840% growth compared to 2020).

» Telegram notifications: Publication of 461 informative pieces between May 2022 and March 2023, averaging 36 publications per month, reaching an average of over 46 thousand users.

» Chatbot promotional campaign: Aired on national radio and television for 97 days, between April 4 and July 20, 2022, the TSE Virtual Assistant campaign reached 199,325,512 people, resulting in 1,837,810,905 impacts on the ABCDE 16+ target audience (Source: Ibope). There were 26,342 broadcast insertions during the period.

» Recognition Manifestos: following an episode of disinformation attacks, the TSE received the explicit support from 115 national institutions through manifestos recognizing the integrity of Brazilian elections and the credibility of the Electoral Court.

» Questions and Requests via the Electoral Ombudsman's Office: during the electoral period, AEED analyzed and responded to 117 inquiries or requests for information or clarifications related to disinformation.

Confronting disinformation through empowerment

» "Fato ou Boato" on TV: a series consisting of 78 videos providing clarifications on prominent disinformation circulating during the electoral period, aired on TV Justiça and partner broadcasters, as well as on YouTube.

» Pills for Democracy Series: quick courses offered on TSE profiles on Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram, reaching an estimated audience of 1.5 million people.

» Electoral Law Course for Journalists focusing on the 2022 Elections: participation of numerous journalists in an event covering various topics, including the security of the electronic voting process.

» Confronting disinformation course for political parties: training sessions held at the TSE headquarters involving of nine digital platforms (TikTok, Google, YouTube, Telegram, Facebook, Instagram, Kwai, WhatsApp, and Twitter), which included 65 representatives from 20 political parties.

» Course on electronic process security for digital influencers: partnership with YouTube.

» International training: AEED and Secom servers participated in an international virtual course on Media and Elections, organized by the Association of World Electoral Bodies (A-WEB), based in South Korea.

» Raising awareness among TRE Leaders: five regional events were held focusing on The Role of Regional Courts in implementing PROFI and PPED.

» Training sessions on terms of use and moderation standards: 26 training sessions were conducted with TSE and TRE confronting disinformation teams in partnership with various platforms including Twitter, Kwai, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, TikTok, YouTube, LinkedIn, Spotify, Google, and Telegram, with a total of approximately one thousand participants.

» Information Session for Embassies: an event providing technical information for embassy and consular representatives focused on confronting disinformation and ensuring the security of the electronic voting process, attended by more than 140 representatives from 68 foreign countries.

» PAUSE!!: 16 digital editions of the Newsletter were published, offering tips, practical cases, and initiatives to confronting disinformation.

» FRENTE national meetings: two national training sessions were held featuring lectures on election integrity, security of the electronic voting process, confronting disinformation, and other topics, with an audience of 800 servers from all TREs.

» Influencers Training: the TSE hosted a training session for a group of 30 participants on the Brazilian electoral system.

The initiative is one of the six included in the "Jogo Limpo" program (Fair Game Program) by the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), with support from YouTube Brazil. Together, these influencers reach approximately 10 million followers.

Confronting disinformation on digital platforms and public institutions

» Disinformation Alert System for the Elections (AS): Received 43,559 reports of irregularities, making a 566% increase compared to 2020.

» Judicial decisions on serious disinformation against democratic and electoral institutions: over 100 court rulings were issued after the publication of Resolution-TSE n. 23,714/2022, addressing disinformation narratives on social media.

» Irregularities Reported to the Court Administrator: Two letters were sent during the election period containing reports on various disinformation-related topics prepared by partner entities of PPED.

» Irregularities reported to the Electoral Attorney General's Office: Two letters were sent during the election period containing reports on various disinformation-related topics prepared by partner entities of PPED.

» Formal Representations before the Electoral Attorney General's Office: 46 representations with potential illicit practices related to disinformation were sent to the PGE via the Citizen's Room.

Irregularities reported to the Electoral and Party Accounts Examination Office

A letter was sent during the electoral period to Asepa concerning suspected irregularities associated with content promotion on social media by candidates registered in the 2022 Elections.

» Reports on undemocratic activities with potential crimes: 93 reports were prepared throughout the electoral period using Osint techniques.

2. EXECUTION AND RESULTS IN THE 2022 ELECTIONS

2.1. PROGRAM FOR ACTING AGAINST DISINFORMATION FOCUSING ON THE 2022 ELECTIONS

The PPED focusing on the 2022 Elections was launched by the TSE in February 2022 to intensify the efforts in addressing and mitigating the adverse effects of disinformation on the image and credibility of the Electoral Justice through short, medium, and long-term actions. Established during Minister Rosa Weber's tenure, the program became permanent under Minister Luís Roberto Barroso's administration, gained momentum during Minister Edson Fachin's term, and furthered intelligence efforts to identify and hold accountable disseminators of disinformation under Minister Alexandre de Moraes's management.

Pillars

The Program to Confronting Disinformation Focusing on the 2022 Elections was structured around the three pillars that guided previous cycles of similar initiatives:

1. **Informative plurality:** *confronting disinformation with information*, by providing accurate and high-quality information to citizens, in order to empower individuals to vote and express their opinions on significant public issues in an informed and conscious way.

2. **Educational action:** *confronting disinformation through empowerment* and training efforts, by investing in the training and development of Electoral Justice employees and citizens to understand the complexities of disinformation, enhance critical thinking skills, recognize false and fraudulent content, and access reliable sources of information.

3. **Focus on inauthentic behaviors:** *confronting disinformation focusing behavior control and occasionally including content control*, including monitoring disinformation cases and practices, as well as directing technological resources and implementing preventive and punitive measures against inauthentic behavior, including the use of computational propaganda, and coordinated dissemination of disinformation.

Scope

The PPED seeks to confronting false and fraudulent contents that impacts: (i) different phases of the electoral process, from candidate registration to the certification of elected officials; (ii) the operation of the electronic voting system and related processes; (iii) the Electoral Justice system, its members, staff, and collaborators; and (iv) other activities related to the organization and conduct of elections. It also addresses anti-democratic demonstrations.

2.2. PROFI - INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING PROGRAM FOR ELECTORAL JUSTICE IMAGE MANAGEMENT

Creation of a program focused on building trust and enhance the image of the Electoral Justice. PROFI provides a dedicated framework to build a positive reputation among the population.

Action axes

PROFI is structured around two interconnected axes: (i) preventive axis (reputation risk management); and (ii) affirmative axis (building a positive reputation).

Preventive axis: reputation risk management

This axis focuses on protecting reputation by identifying risk factors early on.

	Previsíveis	Tratamento (preventivo)	Tratamento (reativo)	Oportunidade
Internal risks	Failures in computerized systems	Public security testing Internal review of protocols	Public clarification (minimizing damages)	Improvement (system repositioning)
	Electronic security failures (hacker attacks)	Investment in cybersecurity	Public clarification (minimizing damages)	Positive framework (failure as proof of system security)
	"Friendly fire"	Approaching dialogues	Disconnection (personal ≠ institutional opinion) Debunking	Reinforcement of image and positioning
External risks	Disinformation	Agreements with digital platforms (PPED)	Fact-check Coalition (PPED)	Reinforcement of image and positioning Heterocertification of Electoral Court (EC's) credibility
	Negative news coverage	Approaching dialogues Training	Release of official notes	Reinforcement of image and positioning
	Institutional attacks (apology for extinction)	Approaching dialogues (political class) Direct and indirect institutional defense (organization of events, publications, etc.)	Release of official notes Search for official notes signed by public authorities/ international organizations Publication of responses via editorials/opinion articles (authorities/stakeholders)	Reinforcement of image and positioning External attestation of the fundamentality of EC
	Incitement to refuse election results	Democratic dialogues (events, publications, etc.)	Release of official notes Search for official notes signed by public authorities/ international organizations Publication of responses via editorials/opinion articles (authorities/stakeholders)	Reinforcement of image and positioning Heterocertification of EC's credibility Association of EC's image with the defense of democracy

	Previsíveis	Tratamento (preventivo)	Tratamento (reativo)	Oportunidade
External risks	Incitement to violence	Democratic dialogues aimed at reducing radicalism and polarization (events, publications, etc.)	Release of official notes Search for official notes signed by public authorities/ international organizations Publication of responses via editorials/opinion articles (authorities/stakeholders)	Reinforcement of image and positioning Heterocertification of EC's credibility Association of EC's image with the maintenance of social peace

Affirmative axis: building a positive reputation

Concentrates on strengthening institutional communication, by leveraging expertise in marketing and branding to develop strategies that positively shape perceptions of electoral institutions.

Strategic partnerships

During the 2022 Elections, TSE's institutional programs received support from 162 institutions that aimed to minimize the impacts of disinformation on the electoral process and the stability of the Brazilian political landscape.

2.3. EXECUTION OF PROGRAMS ACCORDING TO NON-REGULATORY AND MULTISECTORIAL STRATEGIES

Development and results of the main actions carried out during the 2022 Elections.

2.3.1. Confronting disinformation with information

A. Coalition for Fact-Checking – 2022 Elections

One of the key initiatives established to provide voters with accurate information about the electoral process and debunk false content circulating on social media was the creation of a fact-checking network, the "Coalition for fact-checking – 2022 Elections".

Journalists from the nine-leading fact-checking institutions in Brazil, which have collaborated with TSE since the 2020 elections, participated in the project: AFP Checamos, Agência Lupa, Aos Fatos, Boatos.org, E-farsas, Estadão Verifica, Fato ou Fake (G1), Projeto Comprova and UOL Confere.

"Fato ou Boato"

The Coalition for fact-checking collaborates with the "Fato ou Boato" project, a page on the Electoral Justice website that complies clarifications and official statements from the institution, along with all the fact-checks conducted within the Coalition.

The page features various content aimed at debunking false information about electoral institutions. The "Fato ou Boato" provides a summary of each fact-check, accompanied by links for direct access to the articles on the websites of the responsible agencies.

From January to December 2022, 214 articles providing clarifications were published on the "Fato ou Boato" page, which received 5,595,787 hits from users during the election year. These articles led to a collection of 198 pieces verified by Coalizão agencies and clarifications from the Electoral Court, marking a 167% increase compared to 2020 when there were only 74 publications.

Verified false narrative groups

During the electoral period, several false narratives circulated in the media, attacking electoral institutions and casting doubt on the security of electronic voting machines and the veracity of electoral results. These verified falsehoods fall into three main categories:

» False narratives alleging election fraud.

» False narratives questioning the integrity of the Electoral Court or its authorities.

» Destabilizing narrative with anti-democratic agendas resembling coup attempts.

Results

The number of reports and content verified per period on the "Fato ou Boato" page was as follows:

» There were 35 articles between the official start of the campaign (8/16) and the day before the first round (9/30).

» 12 articles on the weekend of the first round (10/1 and 10/2).

» 70 articles between the end of the first round (10/3) and the day before the second round (10/28).

» 10 articles on the weekend of the second round (10/29 and 10/30).

> » 68 articles between the publication of the results (10/31) and the invasion of the headquarters of the Three Powers by coup conspirators (01/8).

> » 4 articles between 01/9 and 03/21.

Increased visibility of the "Fato ou Boato" page

Between the official start of the campaign and the end of the first round (8/16 to 10/2), the "Fato ou Boato" page had 2.76 million views, with 526,697 views only on voting day. Between the end of the first round and the end of the second round (10/3 to 10/28), views reached 4.05 million, 362,625 views on election day alone. Throughout 2022, the page received a total of 5,595,787 unique views.

In addition to accessing fact-checks via the "Fato ou Boato" page, the Coalizão's verifications were also disseminated by media associations partnering with the Program.

Voters also received the clarifications in their cell phones via the WhatsApp chatbot, the official Telegram channel and the TSE social media platforms. Alerts were sent through the Notification Center of the official Electoral Court Apps (e-Título and Mesário).

The reach of the information was also expanded with the availability of two banners on YouTube, linking to the "Fato ou Boato" *playlist*.

B. Chatbot – Electoral Q&A on WhatsApp

The Electoral Q&A chatbot - Tira-Dúvidas Eleitoral, developed in collaboration with Infobip was launched in 2020, as the first partnership between WhatsApp and an electoral body worldwide, it facilitated voters access to relevant information about election and voter verification of fake news.

The relaunch in 2022 was promoted through an extensive campaign on social media, print media, and radio and television stations. Aired nationally for 97 days between April 14 and July 20, 2022, it reached 199,325,512 people and had 26,342 views.

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New features for 2022 included statistical data, information about contested positions, key dates in the electoral calendar, and explanations about permitted or prohibited behaviors during elections. The chatbot also allowed users to send feedback, questions, and criticisms to the Electoral Ombudsman.

In the realm of confronting disinformation, it provided specific fields for accessing information and clarifications about the security of electronic voting machines and for verifying narratives.

Finally, it enabled and encouraged users to register to receive notifications about disinformation and how to confronting it effectively.

After the elections, the chatbot reminded users of the need to justify their absence within the deadlines set out in electoral legislation in order to avoid the imposition of fines.

Não pôde votar? Justifique!

Se por algum motivo você deixou de votar no primeiro ou segundo turno lembre-se que é essencial apresentar a justificativa de ausência eleitoral. Ela pode ser feita por meio do aplicativo e-Título, de forma simples e rápida. Mas lembre-se: você tem 60 dias a partir de cada turno para se justificar e ficar em dia com a Justiça Eleitoral.

Eleições 2022: seu voto faz o país.

19:03

| Acesse o Chatbot | Descadastrar |

Results

Between April and October 2022, during its operational period, the chatbot reached approximately 6.2 million users, marking an increase of over 490% compared to the 2020 elections.

On October 2nd, around 4.75 million users authorized the receipt of notifications (*opt-in*), constituting about 76.5% of the total number. In 2020, only slightly over 13% of users were registered.

Regarding WhatsApp, the TSE account with the Q&A (Tira-Dúvidas) chatbot, reached more than 4.7 million users and registered users in the first round and engaged with more than 6.2 million users and unique users, exchanging over 177 million messages. This represents an increase of approximately 840% compared to the previous electoral cycle.

C. TSE channel on Telegram

In May 2022, TSE became the first electoral body worldwide to partner with the Telegram App.

The Court launched an official channel on the platform, surpassing 100,000 subscribers within just one week.

Over time, the @tsejus channel reached around 375,000 active users during the electoral period, becoming the largest channel among public institutions, the second largest in the political category, and the fifth largest across all categories in Brazil. Globally, the channel ranked 65th among channels listed in the politics segment.

Since its creation, the channel has published 461 pieces of content, with a monthly average of 36 publications. The content focuses on various purposes, including:

» Services provision.

» Building trust in the electoral process.

» Producing important clarifications.

» Bringing TSE and society closer together.

» Strengthening democratic culture.

» Raising awareness about aspects related to disinformation.

D. Disclosure of official information on electoral institutions

D.1. Partnerships with Internet providers for accessing reliable content on platforms

Since 2020, the TSE forged agreements with major social media platforms. Currently, the list of partners includes the following platforms: Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp (Meta); Google and YouTube (Alphabet); Twitter; Telegram; TikTok; Linkedin (Microsoft), Twitch, Kwai, and Spotify.

Information regarding strategic partnerships to confronting disinformation is accessible on the Electoral Justice *hotsite*: https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/ desinformacao/#desinformacao-parceiros

TSE and Meta partnership

The collaboration between TSE and Meta has led to various initiatives on Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp.

Since December 2021, Facebook and Instagram have been directing Brazilian users to official information on the Electoral Justice website through labels added to election-themed posts. Between the beginning of 2022 and the first round, approximately 30 million users accessed the TSE's official page via these labels. During this period, over 74 million posts were automatically labeled only on Facebook.

In just the first two months of 2022, access to the TSE's official page increased nearly ten times, driven by these labels, with an average of 1.4 million visits.

Regarding reporting channels, Facebook and Instagram received over 530 reports through the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections during the official campaign period (August 16 to October 30). Approximately 85% of these reports resulted in actions by Meta. Depending on the cases, these actions included content removal, warning messages, labeling, or referral to fact-checking agencies.

Between late April and early May, Facebook sent reminders - loudspeaker - to users about the deadline for issuing, updating, or transferring electoral cards. Over three million people clicked on the notice, leading them to the TSE's official page.

In addition to ten seminars offered to employees of the Electoral Justice, Meta provided specific training for ministers responsible for communication and staff from TSE offices.

The training included content moderation, confronting voter suppression, incitement to violence, hate speech, bullying, and harassment, among other topics.

In addition, meetings were held with the AEED team to explain the functionality of the ad library and the requirements for accessing the App programming interface (API). This resulted in educational booklets produced with the support of TSE itself.

During the campaign period, approximately 135,000 boosted contents were rejected due to advertisers not completing the post authorization process or for lacking the "Paid for by" or "Electoral Advertising" label, as required by law. Content that questioned the integrity of Brazilian elections was also prohibited.

Meta also released the guide "Women in Politics: confronting violence on Meta platforms", supported by the TSE and the Women's Democracy Network - Brazil Chapter. The document aims to fighting against online gender-based violence and provides a set of community policies from Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp to enable women to connect and express themselves safely.

Additionally, Instagram, TSE, and GirlUp Brasil organized the "Women in Politics" event at the TSE headquarters. The two-day event brought together 27 young people, one from each state and the Federal District. At the event, Instagram launched a pack of stickers to encourage women to vote in 2022.

Facebook and Instagram reminded users in Brazil over 16 years old about voting dates for both rounds, linking to official election information and voting stations.

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On October 2, the day of the first-round election, Facebook launched a label to counter potential fake news about voting results. It informed users that the vote count was still ongoing.

Os votos para a eleição presidencial ainda estão sendo apurados. Veja as últimas atualizações no site do TSE.
Fonte: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Obter informações sobre as eleições

Once the second round was confirmed, the label directed users to results provided by the TSE.

Os resultados do primeiro turno da eleição presidencial foram anunciados. Veja os resultados oficiais no site do TSE.
Fonte: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Obter informações sobre as eleições

A few days before the second round, a new label was launched to reinforce the security and auditability of electronic voting. The label took led Facebook and Instagram users to a specific section on the TSE website.

O voto eletrônico é seguro e auditável. Veja mais informações no site da Justiça Eleitoral.
Fonte: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Obter informações sobre as eleições

Between August 16 and October 30, over 310,000 pieces of content were removed for violence and incitement, and more than 290,000 for hate speech. Additionally, posts violating electoral interference policies, incorrect voting information, or inaccurate candidate numbers were removed.

Meta expanded fact-checking partnerships from two to four for the 2022 elections.

From August 16 to January 8, 2023, the date on which the undemocratic acts occurred in Brasília, over one million pieces of content were removed from Facebook and over 960,000 from Instagram for violating violence and incitement policies in Brazil.

During the same period, over 570,000 pieces of content were removed from Facebook and over 520,000 from Instagram for violating hate speech policies. Bullying and harassment policy violations led to the removal of over 380,000 pieces of content on Facebook and over 630,000 on Instagram.

Conteúdo removido no Brasil no período de 16/08/2022 a 08/01/2023

Discurso de ódio	Violência e incitação ao crime	Bullying e assédio
570 mil	1 milhão	380 mil
520 mil	960 mil	630 mil

https://about.fb.com/br/news/2023/02/nosso-trabalho-para-ajudar-a-proteger-o-processo-democratico-no-brasil-antes-e-em-8-de-janeiro/

In 2022, WhatsApp launched a broad campaign against disinformation, with the motto "Let's fight false information together". The campaign aimed to increase awareness of partnerships established to confronting disinformation and to enhance access to reliable information.

The materials were published both in the TSE *chatbot* and in the WhatsApp partner fact-checking organizations' *chatbots*. They were also shown on Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. Additionally, they appeared in leading print newspapers and magazines, news portals, radio stations, and external media throughout the electoral process. Weekly, approximately 90 million people were reached on digital platforms, and around 100 million on external media.

Additionally, some reminders about voting day directed Facebook and Instagram users to the WhatsApp *chatbot*, resulting in millions of sign-ups during election week.

In another initiative, WhatsApp held meetings with authorities from the TSE, TRE/SP, and the STF to clarify its data provision program for criminal cases, including instructions on how to request data preservation and provision.

The platform also developed an educational booklet, distributed in digital and printed formats to all Electoral Justice bodies, outlining best practices for the electoral community. It also created a card on the security of the App, offering tips for secure and private communication.

To curb disinformation, WhatsApp implemented a new message forwarding limit in May 2022, restricting it to one WhatsApp group at a time. This led to a roughly 20% reduction in the frequency of forwarded messages sent to application groups by users.

In collaboration with Agencies Lupa and Mural, the "Papo-Reto no Zap" (Direct-Talk on WhatsApp) project brought fact-checking to peripheral communities in São Paulo in an innovative and participatory way.

To bolster the fight against disinformation in the final stages of the elections and enhance access to reliable information, WhatsApp launched a marketing campaign in October 2022, emphasizing the importance of not sharing false information. Full-page ads were published in over 2.5 million units of Brazil's leading newspapers. The online version reached more than 72 million people online through Meta's platforms by October 26, 2022.

Finally, 13 stickers were released, including 12 static stickers and one animated sticker, aligned with the marketing campaign promoting the *chatbot*. These stickers encourage content verification, promoting reliable information during the election period.

TSE and TikTok partnership

TikTok established a page providing accurate information about the 2022 Elections, covering topics such as voting machines security and instructions for fact-checking via the "Fato ou Boato" page.

The page, titled "Saiba Mais sobre as Eleições Brasileiras" (Learn More about Brazilian Elections), featured informative videos and was promoted through a banner, appearing as the top search result for election-related terms. Notifications were also sent to all users.

Between February and November 2022, TikTok tagged over 1.5 million videos, with these tags being accessed nearly 17 million times. In the weeks preceding both election rounds, tags were included in live broadcasts, reaching over 40 million people. Overall, the elections page received more than 6.8 million views.

Página especial sobre eleições   *Vídeo com etiqueta sobre eleições*

TikTok also used warnings in various themed *hashtags* to emphasize adherence to community guidelines. The section was accessed nearly 1.8 million times.

Página especial acessível por hashtags

To confronting disinformation, TikTok produced an educational booklet and supported TSE's institutional communication through live broadcasts on election days.

Furthermore, it partnered with Agência Lupa to create a series of videos posted on the official profile (@agencialupa), encouraging reflection on the electoral process and the importance of fact-checking. Starting in July, two videos per week were published with the *hashtag #*fujadafake (Escape From Fake).

At the end of each month, a content creator was invited to discuss disinformation-related topics in live sessions mediated by Lupa.

Close to the second round, a video published on the TSE's official profile (@tsejus) addressing the security of electronic voting machines was promoted by the platform and reached almost 92.5 million views and 725 thousand likes.

TikTok partnered with the Digital Journalism Association (Ajor) and the Instituto Palavra Aberta to provide media literacy training for creators, journalists, young users, and third-sector organizations.

In addition to these trainings, journalists attended a workshop on video production best practices, emphasizing content from credible sources.

The Instituto Palavra Aberta contributed to a campaign confronting disinformation during the first round, promoting fact-checking before sharing. Combined, the videos reached more than 82 million views.

Additionally, TikTok supported a series of 15 educational videos on electronic voting machines created by the Jota portal, with TSE backing. The project covered the creation of the voting machines and their security layers, as well as interviews with the main people involved in their development.

Aviso em conteúdos potencialmente enganosos

As a result of the extrajudicial channel opened in partnership with the TSE, nearly 83% of posts reported through the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections were removed by TikTok.

Proactive moderation led to the removal of over 66,000 videos, with 79% removed before any views.

URLs removidas

Após notificação extrajudicial do TSE e análise pelo TikTok	Por ordem judicial	Proativamente pelo Tiktok
106*	222	66.020

*de 128 enviadas

Despite Brazilian law allowing them, TikTok prohibits paid political or electoral ads. Since the beginning of the campaign, restrictions were expanded to prevent profiles identified as belonging to politicians from accessing advertising resources.

Following the January 8th anti-democratic events, TikTok took a stricter stance. Between January 8th and 15th, over 1,300 contents violating extremism policies, 5,500 violating real-world harm disinformation policies, and 3,600 violating election disinformation policies were removed.

URLs removidas

Por ordem judicial	Proativamente pelo Tiktok
5	10.437

TSE and Twitter partnership

Twitter introduced special themed *emojis* to encourage citizen engagement in elections via hashtags.

It also boosted visibility for live event broadcasts, providing clarifications and reinforcing national election integrity.

Participated in over a dozen TSE-promoted training sessions for authorities, civil servants, and political parties, distributing seven educational materials and six newsletters with crucial information about candidates and associations. Provided consultations to address candidate and party inquiries on platform operations.

It also supported civil society campaigns to boost political participation.

It offered user clarifications via a *chatbot*, covering general election information, media literacy practices, and digital citizenship awareness, along with access to TSE research data.

Media literacy was even the subject of a campaign promoted and created by Twitter.

Collaborated with content creators, influencers, and community leaders to share media education information.

Twitter's policies and actions regarding the elections were the subject of an explanatory campaign in audiovisual format.

Additionally, facilitated two round tables with academics and civil society leaders, along with ten proactive meetings with media outlets, followed by online discussions with reporters. Shared information about Twitter's election-related work with over 800 professionals involved in election coverage.

TSE and Google (YouTube) partnership

The platform utilized a blend of human expertise and artificial intelligence to identify potentially problematic content on a large scale. Automated detections underwent human review to prevent errors. False content alleging widespread fraud, irregularities, or procedural errors were removed after the second round of the 2022 presidential election. Starting November 30th, channels receiving a third warning began to be suspended, supplementing occasional content removal.

Go to the summary

Vídeos removidos por violarem nossas políticas:

+10K
Vídeos removidos

+2.5K
De canais excluídos

até novembro de 2022 por terem violado nossas políticas relacionadas às eleições brasileiras, inclusive as Diretrizes da Comunidade;

+ 84%
Desses vídeos foram retirados do ar antes que alcançassem 100 visualizações.

YouTube introduced information panels to provide users with additional context and direct them to reliable information when searching for or watching election-related videos.

Prateleira de principais notícias na página inicial do YouTube

Principais notícias na busca do YouTube

Recomendar em números

Na busca

De 25 de setembro a 6 de novembro de 2022, a prateleira de principais notícias do YouTube foi exibida nos resultados de busca

+250M
de vezes

De 25 de setembro a 6 de novembro de 2022, a prateleira de últimas notícias apareceu na página inicial do YouTube

150M
de vezes

Até novembro de 2022, painéis de informação relacionados às eleições de 2022 e banners de utilidade pública, inclusive dos resultados das eleições e do Painel de Integridade Eleitoral, foram exibidos

+6.5B
No YouTube

Até novembro de 2022, painéis de informação que ajudaram os usuários a saber como votar e como se registrar para votar foram apresentados no Brasil

+400M
de vezes

Até novembro de 2022, os painéis de informação dos candidatos foram exibidos aos usuários

+30M
de vezes

Entre 25 de setembro e 6 de novembro de 2022,

+85%
Dos resultados

de vídeos em buscas relacionadas às eleições brasileiras de 2022 eram de fontes de notícias.

Nas Recomendações

+ 70%

Em buscas relacionadas às eleições brasileiras de 2022 entre 25 de setembro e 6 de novembro, mais de 70% dos vídeos recomendados vinham de fontes de notícias confiáveis.

To help users find relevant and trustworthy information, search and recommendation algorithms were adjusted to reduce the spread of borderline content and harmful disinformation. As a result, more than 85% of results in searches related to the Brazilian elections originated from news sources.

Throughout this period, informative panels provided users with additional context for certain types of searches.

Painéis informativos de votação e candidatos

Como votar
Mostramos um painel informativo na parte superior dos resultados quando os usuários buscavam no YouTube informações específicas sobre como votar. Esse painel estava vinculado ao recurso "Como votar" do Google, com informações oficiais que incluíam requisitos como documentos necessários, como tirar o título e prazos de votação.

Como tirar o título de eleitor
Quando os usuários buscavam no YouTube informações específicas sobre como tirar o título de eleitor, era mostrado um painel informativo na parte superior da página com um link para o recurso "Como tirar o título de eleitor" do Google. Esse painel apresentava informações como prazos e etapas para transferir e regularizar o título.

Painéis informativos sobre candidatos
Quando os usuários buscavam no YouTube candidatos presidenciais, federais ou estaduais de 2022, acima dos resultados da pesquisa era exibido um painel com informações sobre aquele candidato, como filiação partidária, cargo e, quando disponível, o canal oficial do candidato no YouTube.

Painéis informativos para combater a desinformação

Resultados das eleições
Tanto no primeiro quanto no segundo turno, lançamos um painel informativo com os resultados das eleições na parte superior da busca para consultas relacionadas ao pleito. Logo após a eleição, dirigimos os usuários para um recurso na busca do Google que trazia informações detalhadas sobre os resultados.

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The platform also boosted the visibility of TSE's institutional campaigns by highlighting content posted by the Court. Among others, election results and the TSE *playlist* of key queries from the "Fato ou Boato" page were highlighted.

Additionally, official information was prioritized as the first Google search result. For example, queries such as "how to vote" or "how to use electronic voting machines", were provided with explanations by the TSE appearing at the top of the page. Also, Google sent notifications to all Android users twice in 2022, reaching around 250 million people, with updates from the Electoral Court. Exclusive content about the Electoral Court, electronic voting machines, and the voting process was produced for Alexa.

Informação sobre eleições na página inicial

Other initiatives were carried out, such as the Jogo Limpo program, in partnership with the International Center for Journalists. The Papo Reto Project, based on a study developed by the Brazilian Institute of Research and Data Analysis, in partnership with Jota Jornalismo, explored perception bias and political polarization. And the *podcast Paredes São de Vidro*, carried out in partnership with the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) and the TSE, delved into Brazilian Justice behind-the-scenes. The platform also supported the *podcast Eleições na Internet*, an initiative in collaboration with *Folha de São Paulo* and ITS-Rio, which discussed the role of social media and technology in electoral campaigns, among other projects.

TSE and Telegram partnership

As a result of the partnership, Telegram verified the official TSE channel (@tsejus) on the platform, in order to ensure its authenticity.

It also updated the terms of use to prohibit behaviors such as violence promotion, disinformation, hate speech, and attacks to democracy.

In addition, it implemented a series of measures to confronting disinformation and identify posts potentially harmful to election integrity.

1. MEDIDAS GERAIS ADOTADAS PELO TELEGRAM

Para combater a desinformação e identificar postagens que precisam ser analisadas quanto à desinformação, o Telegram atualmente conta com as seguintes fontes:

- comunicação direta com o TSE através de um grupo dedicado e um endereço de e-mail dedicado;
- monitorar proativamente os canais populares, não necessariamente apenas da lista de 100 canais;
- monitoramento dos principais canais responsáveis pela publicação de conteúdo extremo, desinformação ou discurso de ódio;
- marcação de postagens como contendo informações imprecisas;
- marcação de publicações como contendo informações imprecisas e vincular um canal à verificação de fatos feita por verificadores de fatos independentes;

- divulgação dos canais oficiais do TSE e do Ministério da Saúde no Telegram;
- monitoramento dos principais canais com comentários políticos e sociais com a ajuda de agências de verificação de fatos;
- monitoramento de mídias e redes sociais no Brasil;
- marcação de canais como contendo desinformação;
- promover tags verificadas em canais independentes de verificação de fatos;
- restringir usuários banidos por espalhar desinformação ou violar os Termos de Serviço do Telegram a postar em canais e grupos públicos;
- responder dentro do prazo solicitado a 100% das ordens judiciais recebidas em matéria de moderação de conteúdos.

Starting April 2022, the platform identified and flagged 634 posts as potentially misinformative, with almost 92% automatically identified.

Esta mensagem contém informações não confiáveis. Saiba mais.

The platform partnered with some of the most important fact-checking agencies in Brazil with the following objectives:

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- identificar conteúdos virais no Telegram;
- identificar os temas mais discutidos nas plataformas digitais e os principais temas que estão sendo objeto de desinformação;
- promover a análise de postagens de forma independente pelas agências de checagem de fatos associadas à IFCN, de modo a confirmar a veracidade do conteúdo publicado;

- publicar o resultado da verificação no canal da agência de verificação de fatos no Telegram, que está disponível publicamente para todos os usuários acessarem gratuitamente;
- com base no conteúdo analisado, o Telegram marca conteúdos específicos publicados em canais ou grupos públicos que possam conter informações falsas ou enganosas; e
- implementar outras medidas, conforme acordado entre o Telegram e as agências de verificação de fatos.

Verifying over 215 instances of disinformation. As a result, disclaimers were applied to 121 posts, which were automatically extended to similar posts, including forwarded copies, which generated a reach of almost 900 thousand views.

These agencies published more than 500 posts independently verified targeting the main themes of disinformation shared online.

In addition, Telegram launched two *chatbots* accepting verification requests from users, which helps to access quickly and simple, relevant content that has already been verified.

The platform compiled a list of the 100 most popular channels in Brazil focused on news and political-social commentary, responsible for over 95% of public message views on the platform in the country. These channels are now monitored to define strategies against disinformation.

NÚMERO DE AÇÕES ADOTADAS PROATIVAMENTE PELO TELEGRAM COM BASE EM SUAS DIRETRIZES E TERMOS DE USO

	1º trimestre de 2022	2º trimestre de 2022	3º trimestre de 2022	4º trimestre de 2022
Contas inautênticas banidas (incluindo spam, falsidade ideológica e violações aos Termos de Serviço)	272,000	250,000	365,154	414,491
Comunidades proibidas	37,000	31,051 (incluindo 300 temporaria-mente suspensos)	34,723	75,801
Pornografia	10,700	5,000	15,209	23,153
Violência e abuso infantil	1,100	2,300	115	119
Spam e fraude (incluindo desinformação)	24,000	23,400	18,072	51,304
Direitos Autorais	470	330	806	901
Terrorismo	70	20	78	43

TSE and Kwai partnership

Collaborating with the platform, TSE developed the Central das Eleições (Elections Center) special page, hosting exclusive content about the elections. During its three-month run from August to October, it garnered millions of hits.

Kwai also undertook additional actions with TSE to confronting electoral disinformation in the electoral process. The first, launched in April 2022, was a special page featuring a series of materials that aimed at tackling electoral disinformation in the digital environment, with posts that suggested tips that helped in the search for correct information about the electoral process, through the *hashtag* #FatoOuBoato.

In June 2022, TSE opened a voting machine for the first time on social media. With the hashtag #DeOlhoNaUrna (with an Eye on Voting Machine), videos divided into five chapters were published, in which voters can see how the equipment works from the inside. The material has more than 2.6 million views.

TSE and LinkedIn partnership

LinkedIn curated reliable news about the electoral process for all users, overseen by an in-house team of editors.

Likewise, content moderation teams monitored discussions related to these news stories.

The platform conducted seminars for Electoral Justice civil servants and translated its transparency report into Portuguese, outlining measures taken to safeguard users against disinformation.

TSE and Spotify partnership

Spotify published messages encouraging civic engagement. Additionally, the platform launched a campaign promoting political participation through paid media on other platforms. They also produced a series of exclusive *podcasts*, prominently featured on the platform's special elections page.

44

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D.2. Electoral Justice Notification Center

The TSE operated its Notification Center through its official Apps (e-Título and Mesário), serving as direct communication channels with voters and collaborators. It aimed to swiftly disseminate relevant election-related content, including debunking fake news.

In September 2022, the Notification Center expanded to include a new feature specifically for sending crucial notices to Electoral Justice collaborators. Supported by the Elo System home page, this feature, called the Disinformation Radar, facilitated quick communication for sharing informative materials and issuing alerts to confronting false narratives during critical moments of the electoral process (disinformation trends).

Additionally, the Notification Center extended its reach beyond the Electoral Court's mechanisms. In partnership with the company iFood, on nine occasions, close to the dates of the first and second round elections, messages were sent to over 40 million users about updating the e-Título App and instructions for justifying voting (according to Brazilian Law, voting is mandatory, if the person did not vote, they are obliged to justify it, or pay a fine).

The action resulted in over 47 million views and 1.5 million clicks. Furthermore, an article published on the iFood portal about the partnership with the TSE was accessed more than 1.4 million times.

Content

During the election period, a multitude of targeted messages confronting disinformation were distributed, tailored to the specific audience of each App to enhance the dissemination of official information. These notifications were succinct, direct, and easily understandable, supplemented with links for further exploration of the topics discussed.

Results

During the 2022 Elections, over 40 million users of official Electoral Justice Apps received informative notifications, ensuring the swift and direct transmission of crucial information.

Number of users of official Apps

>> e-Título: 38,335,504 users (112% increase compared to 2020).

>> Mesário: 1,448,868 users (36.5% increase compared to 2020).

Notifications sent

>> e-Título: 25 messages (47% increase compared to 2020).

>> Mesário: 26 messages (271% increase compared to 2020).

>> Disinformation Radar: 2 messages (solution created in 2022).

D.3. TSE channels and social networks

In 2022, clarification and anti-disinformation content published on the TSE's official social networks reached 17.5 million people. Among the publications, the following stand out: clarifications from the "Fato ou Boato" website, thematic series, and announcements from the *chatbot* and the Telegram channel:

2.3.2. Confronting disinformation with training

PPED also invests in initiatives to educate and train both the internal public (magistrates, servants, employees, collaborators of the Electoral Justice and election officials) and the external public (journalists, voters, members of political parties and citizens in general) on the phenomenon of disinformation and its negative impacts, as well as on the transparency, security, auditability, and reliability of the electronic voting process.

Training for external audiences

Events and lectures

With the direct participation of PPED partner platforms, in June 2022, TSE promoted a seminar on confronting disinformation, engaging leaders and representatives from various political parties.

It also conducted an Information Session for Embassies, aimed to provide essential insights about the Brazilian electoral process to ambassadors and consular representatives.

TSE held meetings with the Elections Transparency Commission (CTE) and the Elections Transparency Observatory (OTE) to provide crucial information on confronting disinformation and ensuring the reliability of national elections.

AEED, in partnership with AIN, facilitated extended sessions focusing on confronting disinformation, engaging entities from CTE and OTE, as well as national and international Electoral Observation missions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Disinformation Observatory of the Complutense University of Madrid, and the Higher Education Society of Vitória.

In July 2022, the TSE collaborated with the Supreme Federal Court's (STF) Program to Confronting Disinformation and the Vero Institute to host a virtual seminar titled "The Challenges of Disinformation and Technologies to Confronting It," featuring lectures by national and global experts.

Furthermore, the Rio de Janeiro Section of the Brazilian Bar Association (Order of Attorneys of Brazil - OAB/RJ) organized the seminar "Confronting Disinformation: Democracy and Transparent Elections", in August 2022, inviting external speakers along with representatives from the Electoral Court to engage the community in discussions about confronting disinformation and ensuring the integrity of Brazilian elections.

As part of partnerships with the Paraná Institute of Electoral Law (Instituto Paranaense de Direito Eleitoral – IPRADE) and the Brazilian Institute of Electoral Law (Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Eleitoral – Ibrade), the eighth edition of the Brazilian Congress of Electoral Law adopted the theme "Democracy in Action" to focus on protecting democratic values, electoral integrity, and confronting disinformation. The event attracted over two thousand participants.

Finally, with volunteers from FRENTE stationed in Notary Offices nationwide, 105 lectures were conducted across 23 states.

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NA LINHA DA FRENTE

Nos dias 21 e 22 de maio os servidores do TRE-PA, Márcia Rachel Storck Costa, Simone Maia da Fonseca Santos e Robert Rocha Barros participaram do Projeto Ribeirinho Cidadão – Ação Bagre executando o Programa Eleitor do Futuro na Zona Rural, localidade Ribeirinha de Mocajatuba, do Município de Bagre, uma localidade com inúmeras carências sociais.

O Projeto foi promovido pelo Tribunal de Justiça do Estado do Pará – Termo Judiciário de Bagre, na pessoa do Dr. David Jacob Bastos, Juiz de Direito substituto, com o objetivo de promover ações de cidadania. O acesso ao Município de Bagre somente é possível através de transporte fluvial, que demora em média de 12 a 14 horas, dependendo da embarcação.

Durante o evento, além de apresentar e explicar sobre o funcionamento da urna eletrônica, os servidores falaram sobre o título de eleitor, a segurança do sistema eletrônico de votação e a importância do voto.

Foto de Simone Maia Santos

Informative booklets and guides

The TSE released informative materials with clear, simplified, and concise content, supported by images and infographics, covering crucial topics for ensuring the integrity and smooth conduct of elections.

"*The Voting Machine Guide*" (*Guia da Urna*), created by the Press Coordination of the Communication and Multimedia Secretariat (Coordenadoria de Imprensa da Secretaria de Comunicação e Multimídia) - Cimp/Secom, details the historical evolution of electronic voting machines, emphasizing system development, security mechanisms, and auditing procedures.

ELEIÇÕES 2022
#seuvotofazopaís

GUIA DA URNA

90 ANOS DA JUSTIÇA ELEITORAL
90 ANOS EM AÇÃO PELA DEMOCRACIA

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral

4. AUDITORIA - ANTES

A JE realiza esforços contínuos e crescentes para o fortalecimento da transparência do processo eleitoral e a promoção da fiscalização por diversos mecanismos. As auditorias acontecem antes, durante e depois das eleições, e contam com a participação da sociedade.

A seguir, as principais ferramentas de auditoria utilizadas antes de cada eleição. São inúmeros os processos que reforçam, a todo tempo, a segurança do processo eletrônico de votação.

Testes Públicos de Segurança (TPS)

A cada eleição, o TSE realiza o TPS, do qual podem participar todos os brasileiros, a partir de 18 anos, que cumpram os requisitos previstos em edital.

O TPS funciona da seguinte forma: o Tribunal convoca especialistas para tentar quebrar as barreiras de segurança das urnas eletrônicas e descobrir vulnerabilidades nos sistemas e nos componentes internos e externos da urna. A Justiça Eleitoral brasileira foi o primeiro organismo eleitoral do mundo a promover uma iniciativa assim com a participação de hackers.

In the *Practical Guide – Computerized Elections, Inspection, and Auditing 2022*, produced by the Information Technology Secretariat, electronic security issues are explained in simple language, demystifying technical aspects.

To facilitate public understanding about the technical aspects and security of the digital view of the elections, the Court produced the "*Computerized Elections Glossary*", prepared by Secom. It explained technical terms like biometrics and source code in a straightforward manner.

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Also, with efforts to demonstrate the transparency and reliability of Brazilian elections, the *Practical Guide – Brazilian Elections 2022*, prepared by the International Affairs Office (AIN), provides information on election technology and innovation.

Produced by AEED, the *Basic Guide to Confronting Disinformation* aims to promote the habit of actively fighting false narratives within the community. It offers clear and practical alternatives to address disinformation, thereby reducing its impact on public discussions related to the Brazilian electoral system.

In addition to reaching out to the general population, the TSE created targeted materials for specific groups to sustain efforts in confronting disinformation.

For instance, Secom crafted the *2022 Election Guide for Journalists*, which not only provides comprehensive information about election organization but also emphasizes transparency measures and counteracting information fraud.

The *Guide for Partnerships and Institutional Partners of the Superior Electoral Court*, prepared by AEED, offers guidance to deepen collaborations in addressing the social harm caused by false narratives.

The *Guia do Voto Consciente* (*Conscientious Voting Guide)* also introduced in 2022, reinforces the significance of confronting disinformation. Secom's publication includes critical topics like election regulations and sources for candidate information, along with impactful reminders about the importance of refraining from sharing questionable news.

Periodic bulletin

In June 2022, AEED introduced the *Pause!!* informative *Bulletin to Confronting Disinformation*. Over four months, consisting of 16 editions, this weekly bulletin provided tips, news updates, and highlighted initiatives and best practices developed by TSE partners and FRENTE volunteers.

The name *Pause!!* emphasizes the importance of taking a moment to reflect before sharing news of uncertain origin or questionable content. With a straightforward and relaxed editorial approach, each edition of the bulletin featured six sections, along with a brief explanation of the visual message on its cover.

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Short courses in social media

The TSE innovated in democratic education with its series of short courses on social media named Democracy in Pills. These courses offered daily lessons, each condensed to fit into a single tweet.

The initial module, "30 Pills Against Disinformation", was a collaboration with TRE/BA, disseminated across both courts' official Twitter and Instagram accounts throughout June. It was also shared on the TSE's Telegram channel and broadcast lists maintained for journalists.

The series continued in September with "10 Pills for Tolerance", aligning with PROFI's agenda for preventing political violence.

This initiative reached over a million internet users, providing concise courses on vital democracy-related topics.

Training for journalists

In August 2022, the TSE hosted another edition of the 2022 Election Coverage and Electoral Law course. The objective was to equip press professionals with the necessary knowledge to deliver accurate information about the electoral process to the public.

This course, consisting of 11 thematic modules, was a collaboration between Cimp/Secom and the Electoral Judiciary School (Escola Judiciária Eleitoral - EJE). Taught by internal experts, it covered various topics such as the roles and functions of the Electoral Justice, the TSE's role in election organization, participation of minority groups in politics, transparency, security, and auditability of the electronic voting system, and initiatives to confronting disinformation.

The course sessions are available on the TSE's YouTube channel. The sessions were attended by 759 journalists during the event.

Training for Election Officials

The Election Officials Working Group (GT-Mesário), under the coordination of the Personnel Management Secretariat (SGP/TSE), revamped training activities for citizens enlisted for electoral duties. This was facilitated through the Mesário App/channel, the Moodle platform for distance learning (EaD), as well as other channels such as YouTube videos and programs on TV Justiça.

These training sessions reached over 1.3 million official voting workers, providing them with specific instructions regarding their role in confronting disinformation. The updated version of the Manual do Mesário (*Voting Officer's Manual*) addressed these issues in a straightforward and practical manner.

Training for the Internal Audience

These programs also included training initiatives aimed at the internal audience, focusing not only on confronting disinformation but also on democratic agendas related to the essentiality of electoral institutions, the importance of peace and tolerance, and the appreciation of democracy.

Awareness meetings at the Regional Electoral Courts

PROFI emphasized network action as a key communication guideline with the public. While the fight against disinformation is nationally coordinated by the TSE, it must also have a crosscutting impact at the state and local levels, involving TREs and Electoral Registries.

The TSE organized two national meetings and five regional meetings, attended by presidents, directors, and general directors of all Electoral Courts. Additionally, AEED led five regional meetings to introduce reputation management programs, contextualize the risks involved, and highlight the expansive nature of disinformation attacks against the Electoral Court.

As a result, the number of civil servants formally engaged in confronting disinformation significantly increased compared to the previous cycle.

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Number of people engaged in Electoral Zones in 2022: 2,102.

National call-to-action caravan

Between April and May, AEED conducted a virtual caravan across all Electoral Courts in the country, hosting 19 awareness events and call-to-action sessions. With the support of Secom and the communication offices of Regional Courts, all civil servants were invited to attend an exhibition on the phenomenon of disinformation and its detrimental impact on both professional and personal spheres.

During these exhibitions, which also featured the presentation of the "*Manual for Confronting Disinformation and Reputation Defense of Electoral Justice*" (*Manual de Enfrentamento à Desinformação e Defesa Reputacional da Justiça Eleitoral*), over 6,000 attendees were encouraged to join FRENTE. They had the opportunity to learn about its foundations, purposes, guiding principles, and incentive policies.

With a final number of 2,102 enrolled, the caravans achieved a **attendance rate of over 35% of the audience.**

Caravana da Frente Nacional de Enfrentamento à Desinformação

FRENTE national meetings

Following enrollment, FRENTE volunteers underwent specific training to confronting disinformation. They were provided with informative materials such as manuals, maps, and bulletins, and participated in lectures conducted by experts from AEED, SMG, and STI of TSE, as well as from universities and partner institutions of PROFI and PPED.

The 1st and 2nd National Meetings of FRENTE were held in June and August, featuring a total of seven lectures covering topics such as:

» Reputation defense and building social trust.

» Integrity of Brazilian elections.

» Transparency of Brazilian elections.

» Security of the electronic voting process.

» Disinformation against the electronic voting process.

» Non-violent communication techniques for debunking fake news.

» Fostering peace and tolerance during elections.

Courses, technical visits, and international exchange workshops

During the 2022 Elections, the TSE, sometimes with support from partner institutions, initiated several actions to train and update internal teams, fostering continuous engagement with the forefront of confronting disinformation.

Initially, employees from AEED, AIN, and Secom took part in a virtual course organized by the World Association of Electoral Bodies (A-WEB), based in South Korea. Over a period of approximately 10 days, experts and members from electoral institutions of 11 countries discussed topics related to maintaining the integrity of elections, particularly focusing on the role of digital media and press during electoral periods.

Starting in February, AEED began hosting recurring workshops to exchange experiences with various international electoral bodies. In these joint meetings, lasting about three hours on average, participants delved into detailed discussions about respective institutional programs and campaigns. They also explored challenges and opportunities for collaborative action, both in confronting false narratives and in strengthening institutional capacities.

Within this framework, teams from AEED and Secom engaged in dialogs, facilitated by AIN, with experts responsible for relevant areas at institutions such as the National Electoral Institute (INE/Mexico), the Electoral Court of Panama, the National Elections Juror (Peru), and the Supreme Elections Court (Costa Rica).

In July, five civil servants from AEED, AIN, and Secom embarked on technical visits to Europe, facilitating the exchange of experiences and expertise in confronting disinformation. Funded by the European Union through a partnership with the European Union – Brazil Dialogue Support Facility, the mission comprised 15 meetings with 16 entities based in three different countries:

Belgium:

» Federal Department of Internal Affairs.

» Superior Audiovisual Council.

» South American Division of the European External Action Service.

» Strategic Communication and Intelligence Analysis Division of the European External Action Service.

» Directorate-General for Justice of the European Commission (DG Justice).

» European Parliament.

» General Directorate for Internal Market (DG Grow).

» Division for Democracy and Electoral Observation of the European External Action Service.

» Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG Connect).

» Digital Media and Disinformation Observatory (EDMO BELUX).

France:

» Communications Regulatory Authority (ARCOM).

» Surveillance and Protection Service Against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM).

» General Secretariat of Defense and National Security (ASSIN).

Germany:

» Department of International Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Communications.

» Democracy Reporting International (DRI).

» Berlin Social Science Center (WZB).

Go to the summary

Missão brasileira discute estratégias de combate à desinformação com a União Europeia

Grupo debateu com especialistas análise de riscos, manipulação de informações e empoderamento do eleitor, entre outros temas

07/07/2022 16:17 - Atualizado em 11/08/2022 13:43

Training in crisis management and organizational reputation

To enhance competencies in managing image crises and fostering social trust, AEED endeavored to train its team in these specific areas. Selected personnel participated in a Crisis Management and Organizational Reputation course conducted by the Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM). Following the training, experiences were shared through a meeting to disseminate knowledge further.

Training in community standards and regulation of digital platforms

To bolster PPED's response capabilities, particularly in addressing misinformative practices and enhancing control over inauthentic behaviors and false narratives on digital platforms, the TSE, in collaboration with the Universidade do Extremo Sul Catarinense (Unesc), provided AEED staff with a training course titled "Social Media, Disinformation, and Content Moderation in Brazil."

Focal point training provided by digital platforms

The social communication and disinformation teams of the TREs underwent training through a series of 26 events facilitated by teams from Twitter, Kwai, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, TikTok, YouTube, LinkedIn, Spotify, Google, and Telegram. These events covered diverse topics, from understanding terms of use and moderation policies to facilitating compliance with court orders and enhancing performance in institutional communication endeavors.

These initiatives engaged all Electoral Courts nationwide, involving over a thousand participants. They were complemented by the distribution of informative materials to reinforce learning.

Parceria LinkedIn & TSE

Combate à Desinformação

1. **LinkedIn Notícias:** parceria editorial de conteúdo sobre eleições
2. **Canal de comunicação** e denúncias sobre desinformação
3. **Workshops**
4. Tradução do **Relatório de Transparência**

2.3.3. Confronting disinformation focusing on inauthentic behavior control

throughout the 2022 Elections, the TSE continued to implement concrete measures to detect, discourage, and mitigate disinformation practices. This involved leveraging technological resources and undertaking preventive and punitive actions against illegitimate behavior.

Priority was placed on controlling inauthentic behaviors, alongside addressing more severe instances of false and fraudulent content, albeit in exceptional circumstances.

A. Establishment of the disinformation alert system for elections

As a progression from the mass data attack reporting channel, which was established in partnership with WhatsApp for the 2022 elections, the TSE introduced the Disinformation Alert System for Elections in June.

Designed as a citizen-centric tool, this system enables individuals to report incidents involving the dissemination of false news or statements regarding the Electoral Court, its authorities, civil servants, as well as its products (such as the electronic voting machine) or services (such as elections).

Sistema de Alerta

Este canal possibilita o envio de denúncias sobre o processo eleitoral.

Desinformação sobre candidatos ou partidos (incluindo pesquisas manipuladas e propaganda irregular)

Clique para registrar uma denúncia

Desinformação sobre a Justiça Eleitoral, urnas eletrônicas ou contagem de votos.

Clique para registrar uma denúncia

Discurso de ódio, violência política e grave perturbação ao ambiente democrático

Clique para registrar uma denúncia

Mensagens não solicitadas com conteúdo eleitoral no WhatsApp (Disparo em massa)

Clique para registrar uma denúncia

The system features a user-friendly interface, requiring minimal input, including the URL indication and the option to upload files.

Results

Between June 21, 2022, and the conclusion of this report on March 23, 2023, the Alert System received 43,559 reports, comprising:

- » 5,145 reports of mass data attacks.
- » 16,153 reports of inauthentic behavior.
- » 14,061 reports of disinformation.
- » 3,198 reports of hateful or violent speech.
- » 4,338 reports of serious disruptions to the democratic environment.
- » 370 reports of data leaks or cyber-attacks.
- » 286 reports of gender-based violence.

Irregularidades apontadas

Pie chart values: 1%, 1%, 12%, 37%, 32%, 7%, 10%

Legend:
- Disparos em massa
- Desinformação
- Perturbações do ambiente democrático
- Violência de gênero
- Comportamentos inautênticos
- Discursos odiosos ou violentos
- Incidentes cibernéticos

Compared to the 2020 municipal elections, where the system exclusively received reports of mass data attacks, the total volume of alerts received increased by 733%.

Out of the total, 26,285 reports were forwarded to the platforms, representing 68%. Another 32% of the received complaints were archived due to either the absence of irregularities or not falling within the scope of the PPED.

The Alert System also facilitated the occasional recording of complaints from monitoring partners and institutional allies, along with regular use by FRENTE personnel, who were instructed to accelerate the identification of serious false narratives by AEED.

B. Strengthening the monitoring network for disinformation practices against the electoral process and the network of partner digital platforms

The TSE renewed memberships and memoranda of understanding with numerous entities specialized in monitoring open data from social media and established new alliances for the same purposes. More than a dozen companies, research groups, or social listening observatories participated in this network, such as Palver, Ideia, NetLab, InternetLab, Democracia em Xeque, V-Tracker, Department of Computer Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (DCC/ UFMG), Apura, ITS Rio, SaferNet Brasil and Fundação Getúlio Vargas School of Digital Communication (ECMI/DAPP/FGV).

Use of monitoring and evidence preservation tools

In addition to the activities carried out by partners, AEED and Secom utilized social media monitoring tools and open internet data, such as:

» Knewin: tool capable of monitoring, in real time, terms of interest available in open sources, covering all relevant social media such as Google, forums, websites, among others.

» Apura: tool specialized in cybersecurity, capable of monitoring terms of interest available in open sources on social media, search engines and websites, forums, and unfiltered chat Apps on the *deepweb* and *darkweb*.

These tools were employed based on searches for keywords (*tags or queries*), related to prevalent disinformation messages against electoral institutions.

In cases of detecting potentially criminal activities, AEED sought to preserve evidence using the Verifact tool obtained within the scope of PPED.

Results

During the 2022 cycle, the Alert System received 43,559 reports regarding misinformative content:

» From the launch of the System to the first round of the general elections (from June 21st to October 2nd), 22,848 reports were registered (daily average of 219 reports).

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» From the end of the first round to the conclusion of the second round of the general elections (from October 3rd to 30th), 12,606 complaints were registered (daily average of 466 complaints).

» After the announcement of the official results until the end of January (from October 31, 2022 to January 31, 2023), 8,016 appointments were recorded (daily average of 87 complaints).

» From February until the closing date of this report (from February 1st to March 23rd, 2023), there were 89 reports (daily average of 1.6 reports).

PLATAFORMAS OU SUPORTES APONTADOS NAS DENÚNCIAS

In the graph, data concerning LinkedIn and Spotify were omitted due to their insignificant participation in the Alert System, each below 1%. Regarding Telegram, it shares approximately 11% of reports on mass data attacks with WhatsApp. When considering complaints solely related to misinformative content, the percentage also remained below 1%.

Preventive mapping and trend analysis of misinformative and harmful narratives

Aligned with the data-driven guidelines outlined in PROFI, starting in 2022, AEED began producing periodic reports and preventive mapping of narratives detrimental to the image of electoral institutions to support Secom's strategies.

Methodologically, internal forecasts were generated through a combined examination of: (i) events registered in the TSE Risk Management Tool; (ii) social listening analyses provided by partners and strategic allies of the Court; and (iii) catalog of false narratives refuted or clarified on the Fato ou Boato page.

Harmful discourses targeting the integrity of electoral institutions were categorized into three distinct groups, representing overarching false narratives propagated with the aim of swaying public opinion, based on the repeated dissemination of smaller false narratives providing them logical backing.

These false narratives were classified into:

- **Election fraud metanarrative:** seeks to perpetuate the idea that Brazilian elections are manipulated for undisclosed purposes. This is how false narrative spawned, undermining the credibility of the electoral process based on alleged irregularities:

  » in the source code or in the insemination of the voting machines;

  » in public ceremonies or tests;

  » in the electoral registration;

  » in the transport or storage of voting machines, results media or official documents;

  » in voting; and

  » in determining the results.

4. **Unfitness of Electoral Justice metanarrative**: aims to project the perception of the Electoral Justice's technical or moral incapacity to endorse the authenticity of electoral processes. Within this scope, false narratives attempted to portray a behavior:

  » suspicious;

  » partial;

  » abusive; and

  » technically deficient.

5. Anti-democratic metanarrative: promotes destabilizing agendas advocating for social or institutional crises to justify criminal acts undermining the democratic rule of law.

In addition to special reports focusing on risk mapping and proposals to mitigate unwanted event impacts during key moments of first and second round of the 2022 Elections, AEED produced Daily Monitoring Reports of False and Undemocratic Narratives based on data from social listening analyses provided by partners of the Court.

These reports included communication and institutional reaction opportunities, along with proposals for (*debunking*) or prevention (*prebunking*) to mitigate the impacts of disinformation.

APPENDIX

1. STATUS OF ACHIEVING PLAN GOALS[1]

The PPED Strategic Plan outlined a framework of work consisting of **20 projects**, collectively comprising **141 specific goals** aligned with the objectives set forth in the Program's three axes.

Overall, the projects were implemented satisfactorily. It is important to note that some goals were revised, updated, or expanded along the way to better align with the program's objectives.

Institutional organization

The work plan for 2022 included the re-establishment of the Management Group and the Strategic Committee, as well as the formation of an Analysis and Monitoring Group. However, the analysis and monitoring activities were absorbed by AEED after its establishment. It should also be noted that, as the program evolved, the organizational structure also included the participation of FRENTE.

Management group goals:

Goal 1: formalize the creation of AEED and define the composition of the Management Group of the Permanent Program for Fighting Against Disinformation (FRENTE) within the Electoral Justice.

» The Special Advisory for Fighting Against Disinformation was established by the TSE in February 2022 to coordinate, nationally, efforts to confronting disinformation and strengthen the image of electoral institutions. Comprising a multidisciplinary team, AEED is responsible for planning, monitoring, and executing actions and measures outlined in the strategic plans of PROFI and PPED.

Goal 2: maintain instant institutional communication systems among the members of the Management Group, as well as holding periodic meetings of the Strategic Committee.

» Communication between AEED and Secom is ensured by maintaining groups in private messaging Apps. From February to November 2022, the Management Group maintained a routine of holding weekly meetings, sometimes supplemented with extraordinary meetings due to the proximity of key events or when circumstances warranted.

Goal 3: establishing and maintaining a project planning, management, and monitoring system, including digital actions to confronting disinformation.

» All projects and actions related to the activities of the Management Group were formalized in the SEI System (documentary system for recording all processes underway in the

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[1] It is worth noting that the data presented below considered not only the 2022 period but also data collected until the end of March 2023, considering the developments in the electoral process.

Brazilian government) to allow for registration and monitoring of the execution *status*. In fact, planning became a routine, documented in various reports containing preventive or predictive action plans, followed by reports to guide evaluations and learning.

Goal 4: maintaining dialog, through periodic meetings, with: (i) TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation; (ii) regional representatives; and (iii) partner institutions.

» The activities of the Strategic Committee were integrated into AEED, which organized periodic alignment meetings with all regional committees to confronting disinformation, typically grouped by TREs according to regions. Matters concerning the fighting against disinformation were also addressed in national meetings involving Communication Offices, coordinated by Secom. Between February and August, AEED conducted over 200 meetings with partners, either to align efforts or to formalize alliances.

Goal 5: seeking partnerships with new institutions aligned with the Program's purpose, through program adherence agreements, as well as the signing of memoranda of understanding and cooperation agreements.

» In 2022 alone, TSE signed 96 new partnerships under PROFI and PPED, marking a 145% increase compared to the previous cycle. Today, the Court's institutional programs benefit from the collaboration of 162 official partners.

Goal 6: producing and disseminating a post-election document summarizing the Program's results, actions taken, lessons learned, and proposals to strengthen the fighting against disinformation.

» This goal was achieved with the publication of this report.

Strategic comittee goals:

Goal 1: updating the designation of TSE representatives (focal points) who will be part of the Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation. In addition to the members of the Management Group, representatives from the following areas of the Court will also be included in the Strategic Committee: (i) STI; (ii) Aesi; (iii) Agel; (iv) SMG. The Committee will also formally include the President of the College of Presidents of the Regional Electoral Courts and the President of the College of Electoral Inspectors.

» Awareness meetings were conducted not only to encourage Regional Courts to refresh their teams but also to direct the efforts in confronting disinformation to civil servants with exclusive dedication whenever possible.

Goal 2: send a letter to the Regional Electoral Courts (TREs) requesting an update on the appointment of representatives (focal points) to work on the TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation.

» The Regional Courts were encouraged, through letters and meetings, to not only update the appointment of representatives (focal points) but also to strengthen their respective structures for confronting disinformation. As a result, instead of just 27 people acting as focal points, the TREs collectively designated dozens of people, including authorities and civil servants, to work directly on confronting disinformation.

Goal 3: establishing and structure the TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation by defining the workflow, responsibilities of the representatives, scope of action, and deadlines for investigating situations and disclosing any counter-information, considering the seriousness and urgency of different scenarios.

» The work of the Strategic Committee was aligned in several regional meetings and further refined through dialog in an instant messaging group, whenever necessary, to optimize the tasks related to confronting disinformation.

Goal 4: conducting workshops with informational and strategic guidelines for the Regional Electoral Courts (TREs) to enable them to implement and operationalize the functioning of strategic committees within their internal spheres, with the collaboration of the TSE, as well as holding periodic meetings with them.

» AEED conducted orientation sessions aimed at presenting PROFI and PPED, initially with the leadership of the Regional Courts and subsequently with individuals designated to act as focal points or members of regional committees confronting disinformation.

Goal 5: establishing virtual communication groups to facilitate rapid dialog between the TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation and the focal points of confronting disinformation within the TREs, as well as with fact-checking agencies and other strategic partners of the Program.

» Specific WhatsApp groups were created for the Management Group, the Strategic Committee, the National Coordination of FRENTE, and the focal points of this program. Additionally, a national Telegram group was created for all FRENTE volunteers. These channels were primarily used to disseminate instructions, guides, manuals, align strategies, and quickly share official clarifications and fact-checking materials produced by the Coalizão.

Goal 6: establishing cycles of monthly meetings as a checkpoint and information exchange between the members of the TSE's Strategic Committee to Confronting Disinformation.

» Following initial meetings, information exchanges and alignment measures began to be carried out on a topical and daily basis to accelerate processes and save participants' time.

Goal 7: establishing a workflow with the Analysis and Monitoring Group.

» Monitoring began to be conducted continuously and proficiently by the AEED team.

Analysis and monitoring goals:

Goal 1: establishing an Analysis and Monitoring Group composed of court servants appointed by the Strategic Committee, preferably selected from representatives of the following areas: (i) Office of the Presidency; (ii) Agel; (iii) Secom; and (iv) STI.

» Monitoring activities began continuously and proficiently by the AEED team, with Secom providing information received from monitoring reports presented by a hired company.

This observation process led to the routine production of reports containing data and analysis across various fields of interest, such as news coverage, prevention of harmful events, and identification of trends and false narratives targeting electoral institutions.

Goal 2: training members to utilize open data monitoring tools and operate the demand management system (*tickets*).

» The AEED team underwent intensive training provided by the developers of the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections. These training sessions facilitated the improvement of initial system versions based on feedback from the analysis team.

Goal 3: establishing a workflow prioritizing agility and efficiency in registering, analyzing, and addressing each case to minimize response delays (Plan 10-20-60: Register-Analyze-Mitigate).

» » AEED implemented a workflow ensuring speed and efficiency in processing reports received via the Alert System. Secom formed an exclusive team to monitor, produce, and respond to misinformative content, effectively implementing the 10-20-60 Plan in institutional clarification responses. During critical campaign periods, some civil servants worked exclusively on the system, and additional reinforcements were provided on an exceptional basis by the STI team close to voting dates.

1.1. AXIS 1 – INFORM: DISSEMINATION OF QUALITY INFORMATION

This axis aims to create and disseminate true and reliable information about electoral institutions.

Project 1: Massive dissemination network of truthful and official information about the electoral process

Purpose: establishing a broad network for distributing reliable content related to the electoral process to mitigate the impact of "influence operations" and prevent the formation of information voids that facilitate the spread of fraudulent and fake news.

Goals:

Partnerships with Internet App providers

Goal 1: forge partnerships with internet app providers through agreements outlining specific measures to continuously disseminate reliable electoral content.

» Throughout 2022, several meetings were conducted with major internet App providers. These meetings aimed at either renewing existing partnerships with deeper collaboration or establishing new memoranda of understanding. Notably, TSE became the first electoral institution worldwide to partner with Telegram.

Consequently, TSE managed to establish cooperation with 13 digital platforms widely adopted in Brazil, marking a 116% increase compared to the previous election cycle. Currently, TSE's institutional programs have partnerships with the following platforms: Amazon, Facebook, Google, Instagram, Kwai, LinkedIn, Spotify, Telegram, TikTok, Twitch, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube.

Notification center

Goal 2: developing and operating a digital communication infrastructure (notification center) capable of sending short messages to disseminate quality content on Electoral Justice Apps. These notifications will include useful information about the elections, including explanations regarding fake news.

» The Notification Center was revamped and operationalized not only through the official Electoral Court App (Mesário [electoral officials' channel] and e-Título [voters registration App]) but also via the WhatsApp *chatbot*. A total of 51 messages were sent, reaching approximately 40 million people.

Goal 3: enhancing the notification center for Electoral Justice Apps, including features such as indicators for notification reading, sending notifications in audio format, and encouraging message sharing by incorporating forwarding functionalities in the Apps.

» Between August and December, 22 audio communication pieces were produced and sent via WhatsApp using broadcast lists managed by Secom.

Network for sharing truthful information about the electoral process

Goal 4: establishing an extensive network comprised of citizens and public and private institutions capable of receiving and sharing accurate information to confronting electoral disinformation through public campaigns.

» The partnership network was expanded by 145%. Specifically, TSE sought collaborations with organizations having broad outreach, institutional presence, or members across various locations nationwide. This included organizations such as the OAB, as well as Associations of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Judiciary, and Civil Servants from diverse backgrounds.

Goal 5: enhancing the digital communication infrastructure to send short, accessible, and clear messages for disseminating quality content on Electoral Justice Apps and other digital communication platforms.

» The notification center was improved with periodic planning and scheduling. For the 2022 Elections communication plan, an extensive schedule was developed, outlining the frequency and types of messages to be sent on each channel, including official Apps and program partnerships. Communication strategies were extended to partner entities' Apps, such as iFood, a company responsible for food delivery through internet orders, and whose App has more than 40 million active users. That resulted in over 360 million messages sent on nine occasions, providing information about updates to the e-Título App and electoral justification (justifying why not voting). It is important to note that notifications were also integrated into the WhatsApp *chatbot*.

Goal 6: creating and disseminating concise, clear, accessible, and objective messages to inform the public and address rumors and disinformation about the electoral process.

» Clear and accessible messages were shared by TSE on its social media platforms and through the notification center. Following a data-driven communication approach outlined in PROFI, AEED produced a report analyzing target audiences, enabling Secom to tailor language and communication channels for a more effective approach.

Goal 7: establishing a diverse and collaborative network through partnerships with civil society entities, opinion leaders, personalities, and digital influencers, ensuring the selection of influencers mitigates potential cognitive biases.

» Through a partnership with YouTube, the TSE hosted visits from digital influencers, allowing them to gain a thorough understanding of topics related to the security of electronic voting processes. Consequently, they became equipped to provide accurate information about how elections function. Additionally, Google, TikTok, and Kwai developed dedicated pages with exclusive content about the elections. YouTube organized closed meetings with digital content creators and provided access to two *nitrate* sessions, promoting the "Fato ou Boato" project *playlist*. Concurrently, Google sent notifications to Android users and created election-themed *GIFs*. Amazon incorporated election-related texts into Alexa, and Spotify produced a series of exclusive podcasts associated with video content, prominently featured on a dedicated elections page.

Goal 8: operationalizing the network of disseminators of accurate information about the electoral process by sharing selected content with partners, including communication and media associations.

» The network of disseminators expanded exponentially, with over 2,100 participants engaged and the establishment of FRENTE. This growth was facilitated by the publication of specialized guides (*Manual for Fighting Against Disinformation* and *Reputation Defense of Electoral Justice* and *Basic Guide for Confronting Disinformation*). Through PROFI and numerous meetings with academic and civil society partners, TSE encouraged discussions promoting democratic agendas through opinion articles, interviews, debates, lectures, and events.

Goal 9: developing partnerships with communication and media associations to establish a network of disseminators of reliable information on the electoral process, including fact-checked content.

» In partnership with Redes Cordiais (Cordial Network), three online training sessions were conducted for 46 influencers on the electoral process. In August 2022, face-to-face training sessions were held for 29 influencers, collectively reaching around 10 million followers across major channels. This initiative was among the six selected for the Programa Jogo Limpo by the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), supported by YouTube Brazil. Selected projects received funding and mentoring to counter disinformation before elections. Additionally, ongoing communication was maintained with associations such as the Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters (Abert), Brazilian Press Association (ABI), and National Newspaper Association (ANJ), providing institutional information about the electoral process.

Goal 10: expanding the network of information disseminators by producing and offering a comprehensive communication kit on the voting process, regularly updated. Thus, program partners and other institutions will have enough informational support to build their own messages about the integrity and security of the electronic voting process.

» A dedicated section was established on the Electoral Justice website (https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/urna-eletronica/). Additionally, the series of 2022 Election Booklets was created, consisting of four booklets. This material was specifically developed to address the main inquiries received by Secom throughout 2022 regarding the electoral process, confronting disinformation with accurate information. The booklets include: a) *IT Glossary*: containing concise explanations of 33 technical terms used in daily electoral processes by the IT department, such as Voting Machine Report Card, source code, flash card, voting machine log, Integrity Test of electronic voting machine, and zeresima; b) *Voting Machine Guide*: detailing the history of the equipment from 1996 until its nationwide implementation in 2000, highlighting technological advancements, security measures, and audit capabilities; c) *Conscious Voter Guide*: addressing questions about what to bring on voting day, what is allowed and prohibited, and how to trust the security of the voting machine, among other topics; and d) *Conscientious Voting Guide*: designed to assist voters in making informed decisions and explaining the roles of positions up for election in 2022, along with the rules governing the election and financing of electoral campaigns.

TSE channels and social networks

Goal 11: expanding its presence on social networks through official TSE (Superior Electoral Court) profiles on today's major digital platforms.

» The TSE *chatbot* on WhatsApp had over 6.2 million users, making it the largest on WhatsApp globally. At the peak of the electoral period, the TSE channel on Telegram had 370 thousand subscribers. Between August and December 2022, the "Fato ou Boato" website had 9 million visits, compared to 256,417 visits during the 2020 election period. The TSE TikTok account began 2022 with 43,495 followers and ended with 151,600. The TSE Kwai profile, launched in July 2022, ended the year with 474.2k followers. On Instagram, the TSE gained 238,605 followers in January, reaching 432,360 by December. On Facebook, the number increased from 244 thousand users in January to 311,682 in December, and on Twitter, from 421 thousand followers in January to 666 thousand in December.

Goal 12: Produce quality content with accessible and inclusive language, available across multiple channels and formats.

» All publications and campaigns developed by Secom were guided by principles of objectivity, clarity, and simplification. To effectively reach diverse audiences, messages were disseminated through various mediums, including text, images, audio, and video, across different platforms such as social media, video hosting platforms, private messaging Apps, radio and TV channels, and official websites.

Goal 13: producing and distributing materials and publications on social media regarding the phenomenon of disinformation in the electoral process and the importance of fact-checking. Contacts with digital influencers.

> » Publications were created on this theme, such as a tribute from the Electoral Court to partner fact-checking agencies. The importance of fact-checking agencies was also highlighted in various official documents and publications, including the *Basic Guide for Fighting Against Disinformation*, *Manual for Confronting Disinformation* and *Reputation Defense of the Electoral Court*, and the *Guide for Institutional Partners of the Superior Electoral Court.*

Goal 14: establishing contact and organize workshops for digital influencers with national or regional reach, enabling them to produce content about the Brazilian electoral process in their own style to reach their followers.

> » With the assistance of partnerships, a training initiative was conducted for digital influencers from various niches. This included hands-on experience with an electronic voting machine, along with instructions on its various features and security measures of the voting process. The initiative was one of six included in the ICFJ Programa Jogo Limpo, with the support of YouTube Brazil. A total of 75 digital influencers were trained in partnership with Redes Cordiais. Additionally, there were two editions of the Creators Concil with YouTube, involving 80 content creators. Besides that, around 70 influencers were trained with Kwai.

Project 2: Chatbot – Electoral Q&A on WhatsApp

Objectives: reactivate and enhance the *chatbot* for reactive and proactive use of the WhatsApp Business API tool, in collaboration with WhatsApp, to facilitate access to useful information about the Electoral Justice and elections, and to verify the inclusion of new functionalities.

Goals:

Goal 1: reactivate and enhance the *chatbot* for reactive and proactive use of the WhatsApp Business API tool, in collaboration with WhatsApp, to facilitate public access to useful information about the Electoral Justice and elections.

> » » The *chatbot* was relaunched in an improved format, expanding the variety of available information, and enhancing the user experience. The TSE *chatbot* on WhatsApp had over 6.2 million users, making it the largest on WhatsApp globally.

Goal 2: keeping the *chatbot* active during non-election periods. The volume of messages exchanged with voters on Electoral Q&A on WhatsApp during the 2020 Elections demonstrated the utility and convenience of the tool in expanding the Court's communication with citizens.

> » The chatbot was launched in April 2022 and remained active throughout the critical period of the elections, until the conclusion of the presidential elections.

Goal 3: defining structure and content for the TSE *chatbot* on WhatsApp. In 2020, the *chatbot* initially operated through a decision tree, in which voters selected predefined navigation options from menus. Enhancing communication through natural language processing integration was aimed at enabling the *bot* to understand voter intent more comprehensively

» In partnership with Meedan, the *chatbot* underwent improvements using Artificial Intelligence, streamlining navigation and information retrieval.

Goal 4: produce content for proactive use of the WhatsApp Business API tool in sporadic and exceptional situations, such as the circulation of serious disinformation affecting the electoral process.

» During the 2022 Elections, the WhatsApp Business Broadcast List became a vital communication channel for promptly delivering decisions, official statements, and communications to journalists. Since 2021, this list has been the primary means of disseminating official and credible information swiftly. Additionally, the TSE *chatbot* started allowing and encouraging specific registrations for receiving unsolicited messages, in the form of notifications regarding elections and disinformation.

Goal 5: implementing new functionalities encompassing voter training and media literacy, including gamified activities related to the production, consumption, and filtration of disinformation concerning the electoral process.

» » Explanation flows regarding voting machines and the electoral process, among other services, were implemented. Furthermore, information consumption with filters was facilitated through Artificial Intelligence, in collaboration with Meedan.

Goal 6: expanding the *chatbot*'s outreach and establish opt-in strategies to maintain and increase the user base, particularly for proactive communication.

» Broad campaigns were conducted, including partnerships with television stations, in collaboration with WhatsApp. The number of opt-in users was boosted, achieving successful levels.

Project 3: Enhancing access, dissemination, and reach of electoral fact-checking

Objective: contributing to the dissemination of fact-checks conducted within the Coalizão, ensuring that voters can easily access truthful information about the electoral process and explanations of rumors during elections.

Goals:

Goal 1: improve the "Fato ou Boato" page – a hub for official information and fact-checks about the electoral process – to host content in various formats and sources, and improve navigation for easy access to fact-checks and materials. Changes may include integrating with the WhatsApp *chatbot*, using tags to organize content, facilitating search, adding *links* for easy sharing on social networks, and validating the use of a tool to collect access statistics.

» The page has been improved, now featuring a search engine. Fact-checking materials have been widely disseminated, including the use of *chatbots*, social media profiles, and groups in private messaging App.

Goal 2: import the contents of the "Explanations" page related to the 2018 Elections to the "Fato ou Boato" page, centralizing all fact-checks and official information produced into a single repository.

» The «Fato ou Boato» page now serves as a single repository for all official notes and information related to disinformation, produced by both the TSE and TREs, along with all fact-checking materials published within the Coalizão's scope.

Goal 3: establishing a partnership with mobile telecommunication companies to enable their users to access fact-checks and other informative content on the Electoral Justice website without data charges (zero rating), aiming to maintain this partnership beyond the electoral period.

However, technical issues, particularly the inability to provide a unique IP for the TSE due to the characteristics of the product operated by the new winner of the CDN (Content Delivery Network or Rede de Entrega de Conteúdo) bid, rendered the renewal of the *zero-rating* action in 2022 unfeasible.

Goal 4: expanding the dissemination of fact-checks conducted by institutions in the Fact-Checking Coalizão, including them through references in the TSE's official explanations.

» Dissemination has expanded significantly due to increased usage of official Electoral Justice Apps and the WhatsApp *chatbot*, alongside the creation of a public channel on Telegram and presence on other social networks like Kwai. Additionally, internal Apps have been included in the notification strategy, with the involvement of partner entities and the establishment of FRENTE project.

Goal 5: validating integration protocols with fact-checking institutions to ensure greater visibility for fact-checks conducted by agencies by validating integration protocols, such as *claim review*, and prioritizing truthful content.

» During meetings, the TSE emphasized to fact-checking agencies the importance of using the *claim review* protocol and sought to validate its functionality with platforms. For instance, YouTube began adopting it in 2022, unlike what happened in 2020. These measures are crucial because searches on platforms like Google, Bing, and YouTube prioritize content with these tags.

Goal 6: strengthening the fact-checking ecosystem through initiatives to support institutions, notably by encouraging dialog with other partners and increasing the visibility of content.

» » With the objective of enhancing the fact-checking ecosystem through initiatives supporting verification institutions, the TSE reinforced the expertise of verification institutions and the excellence of their work in media literacy and confronting disinformation during meetings with TREs. Moreover, it recommended digital platforms formalize partnerships with fact-checking agencies to reinforce efforts to confront fake news on their networks.

Project 4: Deepening electoral transparency

Purpose: increasing transparency in electoral processes by disseminating information about initiatives to expand access to inspection and audit procedures of electronic voting process.

Goals:

Goal 1: promote transparency actions through various channels, such as social media, press releases, and program partners, including opening the source code and establishing the Elections Transparency Commission and Elections Transparency Observatory.

» Throughout 2022, one of the main objectives of the TSE was to strengthen its institutional image in communication efforts. Intense press office work aimed to keep the Brazilian electoral process in the national agenda, as evidenced by clipping reports sent to the Court. Additionally, the results of the Elections Transparency Commission and Elections Transparency Observatory were presented at the II National Meeting of the FRENTE participants.

Goal 2: ensuring widespread dissemination of all authorship and inspection procedures, particularly the integrity test of electronic voting machines.

» AEED organized lectures on procedures, supervision, and auditing during the two editions of the FRENTE National Meeting, as well as in meetings and presentations at external events.

Goal 3: expanding initiatives to ensure greater transparency in the electoral process stages and enhance public understanding of the Brazilian electronic voting system. For instance, efforts included organizing events to familiarize citizens with new models of electronic voting machines.

» Notably, presentation and familiarization events were held with foreign actors, including ambassadors and members of consular offices, as part of the Information Session for Embassies organized by the International Affairs Office.

Goal 4: fostering increased participation in inspection and auditing procedures by public and private organizations and institutions with expertise in technology, human rights, democracy, and political science.

» Additional reinforcement was provided for inspection and audit procedures, including expanding the list of authorized participants and increasing the number of voting machines subjected to integrity testing and auditing, in line with recommendations proposed by the Elections Transparency Commission and the Elections Transparency Observatory.

Goal 5: promoting and encouraging society's cooperation in continuously improving the Brazilian electoral process by providing data access and opening electoral system codes by the Court.

» Several measures and actions were implemented, covering sensitive areas such as electronic voting machine preparation, digital signature and system sealing, integrity testing, open-source code, dissemination of Voting Machine Bulletins, explanations about

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voting machine logs and digital voting records, and the Caminho das Urnas Project (Way to Voting Machine Project).

Project 5: Development and improvement of technological tools and digital channels for disseminating truthful and quality information

Purpose: developing and improving technological tools enabling the TSE to disseminate accurate and high-quality information more efficiently, including:

Goals:

Goal 1: continuously developing and updating the status and performance page of the Court and Electoral Justice online services. This page provides real-time information on potential instabilities, unavailability, and scheduled service suspensions, enhancing transparency and facilitating access to information for TRE voters, the press, and citizens. Additionally, the status page should offer information on available channels for the public to report any issues regarding service suspension, instability, or unavailability.

Goal 2: enhancing the utilization of analytics tools on the "Fato ou Boato" page to gather more quantitative and qualitative insights regarding searches conducted and fact-checked information accessed.

» This goal has been achieved through the installation of the tool on the mentioned website.

Goal 3: collaborating with Secom to continuously improve the Electoral Justice portals (https://www.tse.jus.br/ and https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/) focusing on accessibility parameters, user experience, and dynamism.

» The pages underwent gradual renewal and enhancement.

Goal 4: publishing on the Electoral Justice portals the action criteria and protocols for handling the reports received by the Notes Analysis Group, including examples of disinformation about the electoral process, clarifications on mass data attacks, and other relevant information such as integrity policies and reporting channels for internet App providers.

» The action criteria published in the 2020 actions and results report were repeated.

Goal 5: developing and periodically disseminating a newsletter containing information and updates related to the phenomenon of disinformation.

» This goal was achieved with the launch and publication of 16 editions of *Pause!! – Bulletin of Fighting Against Disinformation*, over four months, between June and October 2022.

Goal 6: collaborate with Aesi and the TREs to create a practical guide for addressing episodes of disinformation during face-to-face consultations or on election day.

» Instructions on handling cases of disinformation were included in the *Voting Officer's Manual* and its training course, the *Basic Guide to Confronting Disinformation,* and the

Manual for Confronting Disinformation and *Reputation Defense of the Electoral Court*. Additionally, regional teams for confronting disinformation were briefed on important details through meetings held throughout the cycle.

1.2. AXIS 2 – EMPOWER: MEDIA LITERACY AND TRAINING

The second axis of the program, Empower, focuses on media and information literacy, and aims to promote educational actions and training programs for both internal and external audiences of the Electoral Justice, including courts, other organizations, partners, and the public in general. The objective is developing skills enabling engagement in the digital world, understanding the functioning and impact of disinformation, and expanding knowledge of the Brazilian electoral process.

Project 1: Training for the internal public on disinformation

Purpose: the aim is to training judges, civil servants, and staff of the Electoral Justice, as well as the public in general, to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the most effective approaches to confronting it, including understanding how App providers' work.

Goals:

Goal 1: collaborate with digital platform partners to organize events for civil servers and judges of the Electoral Regional Courts (TREs), enabling them to comprehend each platform's operation. This understanding empowers them to identify disinformation within their sphere and take preventive measures against its dissemination, as well as report violations of platform terms of use.

» Twenty-six training sessions were conducted in partnership with eleven platforms, reaching approximately one thousand civil servants trained.

Goal 2: offering courses to enhance the knowledge of civil servants regarding information dissemination on social networks and communication strategies. The courses cover: (i) behavioral science and disinformation; (ii) identifying inauthentic behaviors; (iii) and strategies to mitigate radicalism and polarization.

» Several courses were conducted on topics related to the electoral process, confronting disinformation, and strengthening democracy, including two national meetings under the FRENTE initiative.

GOAL 3: distributing booklets and educational materials about major internet App providers to the TREs, containing information on their civic integrity policies and best practices in utilizing their resources and features.

» Training sessions with the platforms included booklets prepared by the partnerships, explaining civic integrity policies, and offering tips for optimizing platform tools.

Goal 4: conducting workshops for the TREs on establishing their own regional committees to confronting disinformation, based on the Committee to Confronting Disinformation model.

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» Five regional meetings were held with the TREs to present the strategic plans of PROFI and PPED, focusing on training and awareness, aiming for deeper and proactive engagement in confronting disinformation efforts.

Goal 5: enhancing and update the Inside the Electoral Process – Confronting Disinformation course with recent and supplementary materials.

» The internal training strategy began with two additional initiatives: the launch of the *Democracy in Pills* series, offering concise and comprehensive courses on social media, and the publication and dissemination of the *Basic Guide to Confronting Disinformation*. Furthermore, the TSE published more specific materials with the same objective, highlighting the *Voting Machine Guide*, produced by Secom.

Goal 6: conducting periodic meetings between the Management Group and Secom to share knowledge about false or fraudulent narratives and meta-narratives used against the electoral process.

» AEED and Secom held weekly meetings throughout the period between February and November 2022. Additionally, constant analysis of narratives and meta-narratives was carried out including follow-up reports on harmful narratives and the *Disinformation Clarification Map*.

Goal 7: distributing quarterly reports between the TREs and the Electoral Public Ministry containing recent data and surveys on disinformation against the electoral process.

» Reports and information produced by AEED were frequently shared via instant messaging Apps with FRENTE, comprised of civil servants from across the Electoral Justice. Additionally, direct contact was maintained with the Electoral Public Ministry through periodic meetings and occasional contacts.

Goal 8: establishing dialog with international organizations to exchange experiences and information about the context of disinformation in other countries, major conspiracy theories, meta-narratives, their modus operandi, and strategies used to confronting them.

» With the support of AIN, AEED conducted several international exchange workshops, engaging in fruitful dialogs with electoral bodies in countries such as Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru. Furthermore, civil servants from AEED and Secom participated in a technical mission to initiate discussions with 16 entities based in France, Germany, and Belgium, with the support of the European Union.

Goal 9: offering a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) on disinformation, targeting the public in general.

» The strategy of open online courses began with the creation of the *Democracy in Pills* series, made available to the general population through the TSE's official accounts and channels on Telegram, Instagram, and Twitter.

Project 2: Prevention of mental illnesses and promotion of mental health among individuals directly involved in actions to confront disinformation

Purpose: collaborating with the Health Care Coordination (Coordenadoria de Atenção à Saúde – Cats/TSE) of the People Management Secretariat (SGP/TSE) to implement actions aimed at preventing mental illnesses and promoting the mental health of civil servers directly involved in confronting disinformation, considering the negative effects of exposure to fake news and hate speech.

Goals:

Goal 1: organizing a meeting with the SGP/TSE and the Cats/TSE to discuss preventive measures for mental disorders and the promotion and preservation of the mental health of members, civil servants, and collaborators of the TSE and the TREs.

» With the support of Cats, the TSE conducted the Stress Coping Workshop – 2022 Elections, which involved the establishment of a practical experiential group aimed at minimizing and eliminating the harmful effects on the well-being and mental and emotional health of individuals directly involved in confronting disinformation. During the month of June, workshops led by 16 psychologists from the Electoral Court served 294 civil servants, divided into 5 different groups.

Goal 2: implementing periodic mental health actions and publicize the service channel.

» In addition to the aforementioned care and prevention workshops, the Electoral Justice health units remained available to servers who expressed their need for individualized care.

Project 3: Training for internal and external audiences on the electoral process

Purpose: training magistrates, civil servants, collaborators of the Electoral Justice, as well as program partners, journalists, trainers, opinion leaders, digital influencers, and the broader public on the security of the electoral process, enabling them to: (i) disseminate truthful information about elections in general and the electronic voting process in particular; and (ii) exercise citizenship and political rights consciously and informedly.

Goals:

Goal 1 promoting the training of spokespersons for the Electoral Justice (presidents, vice-presidents, ministers, judges, directors-general, managers, and heads of the Notary Office) to strengthen institutional discourse in defense of the electoral process.

» The designated spokespersons were instructed and always accompanied by professionals from Secom.

Goal 2: training focal points for confronting disinformation within the scope of the TREs (Regional Electoral Courts) to creating networks for the dissemination of official information.

» In addition to introductory meetings and alignment of actions, training sessions were conducted with the platforms, along with two national events within the scope of the FRENTE project.

Goal 3: organizing workshops for fact-checking institutions and civil society partners to address the electronic voting process and disinformation related to electronic voting machine security.

» There were conducted courses for Journalist alongside the publication of educational materials such as the *Guide to Machine Voting* (*Guia da Urna*).

Goal 4: training journalists and civil servants on the electoral process, covering recent legislative changes, general aspects of Electoral Justice organization and functioning, accountability, and electoral context disinformation.

» A new edition of the Electoral Law Course was held for journalists, with the participation of hundreds of professionals. Additionally, civil servants were trained under the FRENTE project.

Goal 5: increasing the dissemination of courses and training offered through the Electoral Judiciary School (EJE) App/channels and the Mesário App.

» Courses offered to the public in general, including those within the *Democracy in Pills Project*, were widely publicized to society in general, via profiles, groups and digital channels on social media and private messaging Apps.

Goal 6: enhancing and deepening the training of election officials with a specific module in the App exclusively addressing disinformation against the electoral process.

» Basic disinformation confronting questions were included in the *Voting Officer's Manual*, in the relevant App and in the syllabus of the training course.

Goal 7: developing training based on the main false news regarding the electoral process, aiming to prevent (*prebunking*) the spread of recurrent ("recycled") false narratives.

» The first module of the *Pills for Democracy* series, titled *30 Pills Against Disinformation*, successfully achieved this goal.

Goal 8: developing actions, with the assistance of program partners, to training voters on creating disinformation about the electoral process through user-friendly interfaces, including gamified dynamics.

» Guides, booklets, and teaching materials were created using clear, accessible language. Free short courses were also made available on social media.

Goal 9: opening the "Inside the Electoral Process – Confronting Disinformation" course to other organizations and the public in general to disseminate basic knowledge about the electoral process, machine voting, and disinformation.

» The strategy of open online courses began with the creation of the *Democracy in Pills* series, made available to the general population through the TSE's official accounts and channels on Telegram, Instagram, and Twitter.

Project 4: Awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information educational actions for the external public

Purpose: training and raising awareness among the public in general about the phenomenon of disinformation, the importance of fact-checking, and the electoral process, in order to: (i) enabling voters to exercise their right to vote consciously and informedly; (ii) empowering citizens to identify and confronting disinformation, particularly in the electoral context; and (iii) preventing conflicts and scenarios of political violence fueled by false narratives about the integrity of national elections.

Goals:

Goal 1: organizing events on disinformation on social networks, featuring participation from TSE ministers, Electoral Justice officials, and talks by subject matter experts.

» AEED›s expert team participated in congresses, seminars, and events organized by most Electoral Courts nationwide, as well as events organized by the Federal Supreme Court (STF), the American Conference of Subnational Electoral Bodies and the Organization of American States (OAS). Additionally, only within the FRENTE framework, Electoral Justice officials organized or participated in community events over 100 times in 2022. Ministers also addressed the issue at various national and international events, including the Brazilian Congress of Electoral Law, the assembly of the College of Presidents of Regional Electoral Courts, the release of the Campaign to Confronting Disinformation by the OAB/PR (Brazilian Bar Association - Paraná Section), the Congress of the National Association of Directors of Federal Higher Education Institutions, International Union of Regional Electoral Bodies, an event of the Organization of American States, *Brazil Conference*, among others.

Goal 2: hosting hybrid or online events on media training, democracy, and disinformation, focusing on youth, featuring TSE ministers, Electoral Justice officials, and talks by experts on the subject.

» The TSE organized live streams supported by platforms like TikTok, Kwai, Twitter, and YouTube on the days of the first and second rounds of elections, allowing interested individuals from Brazil and worldwide to receive official and up-to-date information, with guest speakers from different parts of the country.

Goal 3: producing media campaigns with videos on disinformation and fact-checking, potentially featuring prominent figures in the digital environment, for dissemination on social networks, radio, and television. It is crucial to ensure diversity among campaign protagonists, considering the polarization context on social media that can hinder institutional campaigns from effectively reaching the target audience.

» Numerous media campaigns were developed on the highlighted topics, involving the creation and publication of 217 short videos for distribution on social media platforms.

Goal 4: training communicators and influencers to produce content about the electoral process and electronic voting systems in a language that engages society effectively.

» Through partnerships, a training initiative was launched for digital influencers across various niches. This included unboxing sessions of electronic voting machines, along with instructions on the different devices and security features of the electronic voting process.

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The initiative was one of six included in the ICFJ Jogo Limpo Program, supported by YouTube Brazil. A total of 75 digital influencers were trained in partnership with Redes Cordiais. Additionally, there were two editions of the Creators Council with YouTube, bringing together a total of 80 content creators. Around 70 influencers were trained with Kwai.

Goal 5: expanding actions to confronting disinformation on radio and TV platforms, such as the "Fact-checking Minute".

» Secom produced a series of 78 videos providing clarifications on the main instances of disinformation during the election period. These videos were broadcast on Justice TV (TV Justiça), as well as on partner broadcasters, besides being published and shared on the YouTube platform.

Goal 6: launching a massive campaign against the spread of fake news, seeking support from party leaders, civil society members, and program partners (Brazil without Fake – for a Country Free of Fake News).

» The "Brazil without Fake" Campaign was succeeded by other massive communication initiatives with the same spirit, as detailed in other sections of this report.

Project 5: Cooperation and actions to enhance the reach of partners' media and information literacy initiatives

Purpose: facilitating dialog and cooperation among partners in media and information literacy to extend the reach of existing initiatives.

Goals:

Goal 1: engaging partner institutions working in media and information literacy to discuss strategies for extending the reach of media and information literacy initiatives, especially during the electoral period.

» Meetings were conducted with various organizations renowned for their expertise in this field, including Instituto Palavra Aberta (Open Word Institute), Redes Cordiais (Cordial Networks) and the National Electoral Institute of Mexico, among others.

Goal 2: implementing strategies in collaboration with partner institutions to broaden the reach of media and information literacy initiatives.

» The Open Word Institute (Instituto Palavra Aberta), a partner of PPED, released the #FakeToFora (#FakeIamOut) initiative, through EducaMídia (TrainingMidia). This initiative extended invitations to educators and students nationwide, emphasizing the role of media training in fostering citizenship. Simultaneously, the TSE (Superior Electoral Court) published the *Basic Guide to Confronting Disinformation*, providing information aimed at enhancing the ability to identify fake news circulating in digital media, along with basic instructions for addressing it.

Project 6: Engagement with political parties to raise awareness of their responsibility in confronting disinformation

Purpose: facilitating dialog with political parties to underscore their responsibility for fostering a healthy information environment, discouraging the creation and utilization of disinformation networks and inauthentic behavior during electoral campaigns.

Goals:

Goal 1: organizing meetings with representatives from all national bodies of political parties and party federations, providing a brief overview of the impacts and risks associated with disinformation.

» With support from the Parliamentary Advisory Service (Aspar), introductory and awareness meetings were held for all political parties registered with the TSE. This effort led to the participation of 31 party groups in PROFI and PPED. Involvement of party leaders at the state and local levels was facilitated through partnerships with the Union of Councilors of Brazil (UVB) and the National Union of Legislators and State Legislatures (Unale). A broadcast list was established with partner parties for sharing information produced by Secom.

Goal 2: organizing events for political parties, in collaboration with the program's partner digital platforms, to enhance their understanding of platform operations and improve their ability to identify and counter disinformation within their sphere, as well as denounce violations of its terms of use.

» In collaboration with internet App providers, AEED organized the event "Digital Platforms and Political Parties: Confronting Disinformation as an Instrument for Democracy Promotion", which attracted 65 representatives from 20 different associations.

Goal 3: proposing a commitment agreement for representatives of national political party bodies and party federations to: (i) conducting activities aimed at raising awareness among members about the phenomenon of disinformation; and (ii) adopting measures to discourage the creation and use of disinformation networks and inauthentic behavior in electoral campaigns.

» The agreements were signed by 31 out of the 32 political parties registered with the TSE.

Project 7: Support to other electoral bodies and public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation

Purpose: facilitating the implementation of actions to confronting disinformation in various public institutions and electoral bodies.

Goals:

Goal 1: coordinating dialog with other courts and national bodies through workshops, meetings, and ongoing dialog, both proactively and upon request.

» The TSE intensified collaboration with other public bodies and national institutions, such as the Superior Federal Court (STF), National Council of Justice (CNJ), Federal Public Ministry (MPF), Federal Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Meetings were held, and ongoing dialog was maintained, which, on several occasions, led to events being held and the publication of public statements of trust at significant moments in the process.

Goal 2: coordinating dialog and cooperation with electoral bodies in other countries to confronting disinformation.

» » With the support of AIN, AEED maintained contact with several international electoral bodies, sharing experiences in confronting disinformation.

1.3. AXIS 3 – RESPOND: IDENTIFICATION AND CONTAINMENT OF DISINFORMATION

This axis aims to take concrete measures to identify disinformation quickly, contain its spread more effectively, and discourage disinformation practices and associated forms of information manipulation.

Project 1: Permanent fact-checking coalition

Purpose: coordinating and fostering a permanent fact-checking network and providing information on the electoral process through collaboration and partnership with fact-checking agencies and institutions.

Goals:

Goal 1: holding meetings with fact-checking institutions to discuss the challenges faced and establishing a permanent cooperation agreement.

» Several meetings were conducted, resulting in the renewal of cooperation terms and ongoing joint efforts.

Goal 2: developing and proposing a cooperation agreement with fact-checking institutions to establish a permanent fact-checking network and provide information on the electoral process. This agreement should define, at minimum, the scope of fact-checking (electoral process) and the work plan to be implemented.

» Several meetings were conducted, resulting in the renewal of cooperation terms and ongoing joint efforts.

Goal 3: defining workflows within the Coalizão applicable to the involved institutions.

» Workflow protocols were established in initial meetings and refined through ongoing discussions in an instant messaging group dedicated to the Strategic Committee of the PPED.

Goal 4: organizing a team within the TSE responsible for swiftly gathering and providing information to facilitate fact-checking.

» Secom assembled a multidisciplinary team comprising 15 individuals tasked with monitoring, collecting, and producing clarifications in various formats such as text, cards, videos, and audio This effort resulted in the production of 241 texts, including 43 clarifications exclusively provided by the Electoral Court and 59 pieces of information verified by fact-checking agencies. Additionally, 139 texts were collaboratively produced.

Goal 5: request the update of representatives nominated by each Regional Electoral Court (TRE) to participate in the Coalizão. The request will be made through official letters to the TREs.

» This goal was achieved through official communication.

Goal 6: update the composition of WhatsApp groups and manage an editable spreadsheet to record information flow and fact-checking activities, facilitating the operationalization of the Coalizão.

» Updates were implemented based on member recommendations conveyed through official letters.

Goal 7: ensure periodic access to reports and analytics from the "Fato ou Boato" website once these functionalities are operational.

» Access was guaranteed to Secom›s Media and Web Coordination department.

Goal 8: facilitating dialog between fact-checking institutions and Internet App providers partnered with the program.

» The TSE raised this issue in numerous meetings with digital platforms.

Project 2: Engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in fighting against structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior

Purpose: developing cooperation agreements with Internet App providers to leverage these platforms and their technological resources in disseminating accurate information about the electoral process and confronting inauthentic behavior.

Goals:

Goal 1: conducting regular meetings with Internet App providers partnered with the program to learn about their new initiatives in confronting disinformation and explore opportunities for innovation in the partnership to uphold the integrity of the electoral process.

» Numerous meetings were held to align initiatives and monitor compliance with agreements. In some instances, meetings began to occur weekly. On the eve of the first round of voting, a general meeting was held to raise awareness and emphasize the need for additional commitment to ensure the smooth running of the electoral process.

Goal 2: initiate dialog with Internet App providers not yet participating in the program, seeking their involvement and the establishment of a partnership in the fighting against disinformation.

» The continuous pursuit of this dialog led to a 145% increase in the number of platforms partnering with the program compared to the previous cycle.

Goal 3: establishing memoranda of understanding with program-partnered Internet App providers to outline specific initiatives and concrete measures to be implemented throughout the election year, monitoring the execution of these initiatives through regular meetings.

» Ongoing dialog deepened existing partnerships, resulting in improvements across several indicators mentioned in this report.

Goal 4: proposing enhancements to the civic integrity policies of Internet App providers, based on clear content moderation rules tailored to the Brazilian electoral context. This includes detailing protocols for addressing coordinated inauthentic behavior, the dissemination of misleading information about the electoral process, as well as related issues such as political violence and hate speech that negatively impact elections.

» The cooperation terms stipulate, without exception, the necessity of adopting clear integrity policies, written in accessible language, and genuinely tailored to the national context. Throughout the elections, meetings were conducted with several platforms to emphasize the need for adjustments or updates, which, in some cases, were duly addressed.

Goal 5: establishing reporting and communication channels with Internet App providers to enable citizens and Electoral Justice bodies to report suspected instances of mass data attacks and the dissemination of false information on the internet. This aims for prompt and diligent action in analyzing complaints forwarded by the TSE.

» All partner platforms have established extrajudicial channels for receiving and processing reports forwarded by AEED through the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections. These channels cover not only cases of mass data attacks and disinformation related to the elections but also serious issues such as hate speech and gender-based political violence.

Goal 6: proposing the adoption of an exceptional action protocol outlining imperative and prompt measures in cases of serious disinformation capable of jeopardizing the integrity of the election process. This includes unfounded allegations of election fraud, serious threats, and false announcements about election cancellations. Additionally, conducting simulations of the protocol's operation before the critical election period to assess the speed and appropriateness of the measures adopted.

» In alignment with the preventive planning axis outlined in PROFI, AEED collaborated with network monitoring platforms and partners to conduct a test-event based on monitoring demonstrations scheduled for September 7th. Insights from this exercise, reflected in an internal report, led to adjustments aimed at ensuring the smooth conduct of the electoral process, particularly on voting dates.

Goal 7: encouraging the creation and periodic dissemination of data on the general application of platforms' policies in cases of disinformation (transparency center), especially during the electoral period, for both the public in general and national researchers. Additionally, requesting training on the utilization of this data and APIs for Brazilian researchers and journalists.

» These topics were repeatedly addressed in meetings with Internet App providers.

Goal 8: requesting access to data and periodic reports containing statistics on cases of disinformation received regarding the electoral process and the corresponding measures taken.

» With the introduction of the Alert System, the TSE gained the capability to independently examine relevant data and statistics. Nonetheless, the importance of data sharing and

transparency in moderation activities was emphasized in numerous meetings with digital platforms.

Goal 9: requesting and encouraging the development of initiatives that strengthen the work of national researchers.

» This topic was repeatedly discussed in meetings with Internet App providers.

Goal 10: soliciting and encouraging the development of initiatives that strengthen the fact-checking ecosystem.

» This issue was repeatedly addressed in meetings with Internet App providers, as well as in meetings with Regional Electoral Courts.

Goal 11: promoting dialog between civil society organizations representing vulnerable groups targeted by hate speech and platforms, encouraging the development of initiatives to protect these groups.

» The Disinformation Alert System for the Elections was updated with specific options for reporting hate speech and gender-based violence. This agenda was also advocated in social media campaigns, such as the publication of "10 Pills About Tolerance" within the Democracy in Pills project. Additionally, under the coordination of the TSE Women's Commission, a partnership was established with the Public Ministry, defining investigation routines for electoral crimes of political violence against women, including a special form on the Public Ministry's website.

Project 3: Reporting channel for mass data attacks in partnership with WhatsApp

Purpose: creating an electronic form allowing voters and citizens in general to submit complaints about mass data attacks.

Goals:

Goal 1: building an electronic form allowing voters and citizens in general to submit complaints about mass data attacks

» Goal achieved with the creation and launch of the Disinformation Alert System for Elections.

Goal 2: improving the operation of the reporting channel with the ticket system, increasing the speed in extracting and forwarding data to WhatsApp.

» Goal achieved with the creation and launch of the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections.

Goal 3: publicizing the mass data attack complaint channel well in advance and widely.

» The Disinformation Alert System for the Elections was widely publicized, having a significant impact on the press.

Project 4: Creation of a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process

Purpose: The aim is to establish a network dedicated to monitoring harmful digital disinformation practices during electoral processes. This network, utilizing open sources, should be capable of: (i) identify, expose, and disseminate false narratives targeting the electoral process; (ii) report identified irregularities to the TSE, proposing appropriate counter-information measures and technological resources if necessary.

Goals:

Goal 1: forging collaboration agreements with forensic laboratories, research institutions, and specialized civil society organizations to monitor coordinated networks spreading disinformation. This involves sharing information, setting up communication channels for submitting reports, and providing training.

» This goal was achieved through agreements with specialized entities and laboratories in network monitoring, along with the procurement of tools (such as Apura) and specific services (DAPP/FGV).

Goal 2: establishing collaboration agreements with technology companies to exchange knowledge and conduct joint cybersecurity activities.

» » With the adoption of the Apura tool, the need for additional agreements was eliminated.

Goal 3: hire a specialized company for network monitoring, equipped with Information Technology and Communications resources capable of identifying disinformation practices related to the electoral process. The monitoring tool should operate using open sources and detect disinformation across at least four social networks, based on predefined criteria and indicators established within the Notes Analysis Group.

» This goal was achieved through the engagement of DAPP/FGV.

Goal 4: expanding partnerships with external entities capable of identifying inauthentic behavior and establish cooperation agreements for sharing reports based on public data.

» This goal was met through the expansion of monitoring partnerships, including collaboration with entities like Palver, Ideia, and UFMG, in addition to existing partnerships.

Goal 5: developing an internal ticketing platform, incorporating its own ticket management system, for registering receipts of disinformation content related to the electoral process (referred to as "notes") and for automatically submitting complaints to the platforms.

» Goal achieved with the creation and launching of the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections.

Goal 6: improving the flow of receiving complaints through the Court's Ombudsman.

» Goal achieved through alignment meeting. With the launch of the Alert System, reports of disinformation via the Ombudsman's Office became rare and residual.

Goal 7: the team of civil servants that will integrate the Analysis and Monitoring Group was designated and trained, with coordination by the AEED team. The appointed representative from Secom underwent training to operate the hired monitoring tool and any tools provided by partners with expertise in the area.

» Goal achieved through training with the developers of the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections and with the companies hired for this specific purpose.

Goal 8: hiring a data analysis and disinformation specialist to join the TSE monitoring team.

» With the creation of AEED with multidisciplinary formation, data began to be analyzed internally, eliminating the need for hiring a specialist.

Goal 9: strengthening contact with the TREs (Regional Electoral Courts), through the exchange of information focusing the points designated to work in the Strategic Committee and in the Coalition for Fact-checking, in order to expand and spread the network for monitoring and identifying disinformation on the electoral process.

» » Goal achieved by holding several alignment meetings and maintaining constant dialog in conversation Apps. Eventually, some adjustments and improvements were requested in a formalized way, by sending an official letter by the Presidency of the TSE.

Goal 10: provide a URL perpetual tool or form a partnership with a company that provides the aforementioned service, so that a database of the occurrences received can be maintained, before the eventual deletion of the URL.

» Goal achieved through partnership with Verifact.

Goal 11: establish reporting and/or communication channels with Internet App providers in order to allow citizens and Electoral Justice bodies to report suspected mass data attacks and dissemination of false information on the internet.

» Goal achieved by opening extrajudicial channels to receive reports forwarded by the Disinformation Alert System for the Elections (AS).

Goal 12: implement the Integrated Center for National Command and Control (CICCN), using the existing one under the coordination of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), to identify disinformation practices on the internet; verify the possibility of counter-information measures, with a response to the Electoral Court; and expedite judicial police measures in the event of verified crimes.

» Goal achieved with the creation of the Cybersecurity Center and the Intelligence Center to Confronting Political Violence.

Goal 13: integration of the Integrated Center for National Command and Control (CICCN) and its constituent bodies into training activities.

» Revised goal: with the increased communication between SPJ and PF, integration into the CICCN became unnecessary.

Goal 14: providing the CICCN with data related to occurrences of disinformation against the electoral process to update the monitoring panel released on election days.

» Revised goal: with the increased communication between SPJ and PF, integration into the CICCN became unnecessary.

Goal 15: collecting and analyzing data to support future preventive campaigns, such as a video highlighting the "top 10 recycled fakes."

» Goal achieved by preparing and sending mapping reports on false and harmful narratives by AEED.

Project 5: Disinformation containment on Telegram

Purpose: addressing the challenges posed by Telegram, an App that currently lacks interaction with the TSE or other government authorities despite its high number of users in the country.

Goals:

Goal 1: actively seeking partnerships with researchers specializing in confronting disinformation on Telegram.

» Goal achieved through partnerships with entities such as Monitor Telegram.

Goal 2: encouraging partner entities with accounts on the App to disseminate official information and conduct fact-checks.

» Goal achieved with the creation of the TSE›s own channel on Telegram.

Goal 3: engaging in outreach efforts to international organizations and entities that have addressed the Telegram issue.

» Goal achieved through dialog with authorities from other countries, with support from AIN. The TSE became the first public entity in the world to establish an official partnership with the platform.

Goal 4: assessing the feasibility of creating a "Fato ou Boato" page on Telegram to establish an official source of information and prevent information gaps on the App.

» Goal achieved with the use of the TSE channel for this purpose.

Goal 5: sharing knowledge, reports, and any documents that can assist national authorities in addressing disinformation on the App.

» Goal achieved by sharing experiences in meetings held with other national and international organizations.

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Project 6: Partnership and dialog with the Federal Police (PF) and the Electoral Public Ministry (MPE)

Purpose: establishing a close, agile, and effective communication network between the TSE and representatives of the Federal Police and the Public Electoral Ministry to report cases of disinformation that also constitute legal offenses.

Goals:

Goal 1: requesting the appointment of representative(s) from the PF and MPE to act as focal points for these institutions in the Program for Confronting Disinformation, through official correspondence.

> » Regarding the MPE, the goal was achieved through meetings and sending correspondence, resulting in the formalization of a partnership to confront disinformation. For internal organization purposes, contact with the PF was centralized in the Judiciary Police Secretariat (SPJ) of the TSE, as well as in the Center for Confronting Political Violence.

Goal 2: creating virtual communication groups to facilitate quick dialog between representatives of the PF and MPE, the Program Management Group, and representatives of Aesi to expedite the handling of cases received by the Electoral Court involving indications of criminal activity, given the urgency of such situations.

> » Direct contact was maintained between AEED and MPE and between SPJ and PF, with periodic meetings and occasional contacts via instant messaging Apps.

Goal 3: providing training to the intelligence and investigation departments of the PF and the Public Ministry (MP) on social media monitoring and strategies for confronting disinformation.

> » The MPE team was invited to participate in some AEED training events. With its multidisciplinary nature, AEED now includes staff who are specialists in intelligence, eliminating the need for additional training for this purpose.

Goal 4: deepening the integration and improving the workflow with representatives of the MPE and PF.

> » Technical meetings and flow adjustments were held between AEED and MPE and between SPJ and PF.
> » Issues were addressed and resolved in terms of cooperation.

Project 7: Cyber-intelligence strategic committee

Purpose: the aim is to establish a committee capable of swiftly and efficiently responding to cyber incidents and events related to the TSE's digital infrastructure. This involves taking concrete measures to prevent rumors stemming from minor technology issues from evolving into attacks on the credibility of the electoral process.

Goals:

Goal 1: strengthening channels with key technology and infrastructure providers to contribute to cyber-intelligence strategies throughout the election period.

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» Meetings were conducted to develop action plans, including risk prevention strategies, with entities such as Amazon Web Services, focusing on designing advanced solutions to mitigate risks and ensure swift and effective responses to any complications.

Goal 2: establishing virtual communication groups with members of the Management Group, STI, and technology and infrastructure service providers.

» Virtual groups were formed, with participation from STI representatives.

Goal 3: developing operational procedures with predefined actions in case of cyber-attacks.

» The TSE established a Strategic Information Security Committee (Cetsi), comprising representatives from the Presidency, General Directorate, AEED, Secom and STI, among others. Therefore, Cetsi approved an action plan for addressing incidents involving digital services of high criticality, ensuring prompt and well-prepared responses.

Goal 4: conducting internal simulations, exercises with attack and defense teams, and monitoring.

» Security analysis investigations were conducted on various Apps, followed by the implementation of necessary corrections and penetration tests on App platforms such as the e-Título.

Goal 5: providing training on system security, data leakage, phishing, and other topics related to cyber-intelligence.

» STI organized awareness-raising activities for TSE and TRE staff, emphasizing the implementation of cybersecurity measures.

Goal 6: constantly improving protocols for forwarding reports to platforms, the Public Ministry, Federal Police, and the Government Cyber Incident Prevention, Treatment and Response Center (CTIR-Gov) in the event of cyber-crimes.

» » Internally, protocols began to be handled by Cetsi. In the event of a crime, additional measures are taken by the SPJ, which also compose the Strategic Committee.

Project 8: Review and development of norms to confronting the practice of disinformation in the scope of the Electoral Justice as a way of preventing the phenomenon

Purpose: contributing within the institutional boundaries of the Court to discussions on legislation addressing disinformation and to contribute to TSE resolutions on the subject.

Goals:

Goal 1: monitoring the progress of legislative projects addressing disinformation, particularly Law Project (PL) No. 2,630 (Fake News Law Project), and contributing, as feasible, to the refinement of these proposals.

» Goal achieved, with support from the Parliamentary Office (Aspar). In March 2023, the TSE established a working group with representatives from digital platforms to develop a set of proposals to be submitted to the National Congress.

Goal 2: participation in debates, seminars, and conferences focusing on enhancing the legal framework to confront disinformation, primarily those organized by program partners, civil society entities, and organizations active in the field.

» AEED and Secom experts participated in numerous national events, as well as virtual international seminars and conferences held in the United States, Spain, Mexico, and Argentina, among others.

Goal 3: monitoring TSE and Regional Electoral Courts (TREs) jurisprudence on disinformation and preparing a compilation of the most significant judgments on the subject.

» This task has been integrated into the AEED›s routine, especially since the publication of Resolution-TSE No. 23,714/2022.

Goal 4: ensuring the participation of Program Management Group members in working groups dedicated to drafting resolutions related to the theme to evaluate the inclusion and/or modification of norms aimed at confronting disinformation practices.

» » Goal achieved and already underway, with the drafting of Resolution-TSE n. 23,714 on October 20, 2022.